Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ |
| 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| 3 | * All rights reserved. |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| 7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 8 | * |
| 9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 15 | * |
| 16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 17 | * the code are not to be removed. |
| 18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| 22 | * |
| 23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 25 | * are met: |
| 26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 40 | * |
| 41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 52 | * |
| 53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| 54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| 55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 57 | */ |
| 58 | |
| 59 | #include <stdio.h> |
| 60 | #include <ctype.h> |
| 61 | #include "cryptlib.h" |
| 62 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
| 63 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
| 64 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 65 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 66 | |
| 67 | int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| 68 | { |
| 69 | int i; |
| 70 | X509_CINF *ai,*bi; |
| 71 | |
| 72 | ai=a->cert_info; |
| 73 | bi=b->cert_info; |
| 74 | i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber); |
| 75 | if (i) return(i); |
| 76 | return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer)); |
| 77 | } |
| 78 | |
| 79 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
| 80 | unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) |
| 81 | { |
| 82 | unsigned long ret=0; |
| 83 | EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
| 84 | unsigned char md[16]; |
| 85 | char *f; |
| 86 | |
| 87 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| 88 | f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0); |
| 89 | ret=strlen(f); |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 90 | EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL); |
| 91 | EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,ret); |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 92 | OPENSSL_free(f); |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 93 | EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, |
| 94 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length); |
| 95 | EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL); |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 96 | ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| |
| 97 | ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) |
| 98 | )&0xffffffffL; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 99 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 100 | return(ret); |
| 101 | } |
| 102 | #endif |
| 103 | |
| 104 | int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| 105 | { |
| 106 | return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer)); |
| 107 | } |
| 108 | |
| 109 | int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| 110 | { |
| 111 | return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject)); |
| 112 | } |
| 113 | |
| 114 | int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
| 115 | { |
| 116 | return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer)); |
| 117 | } |
| 118 | |
| 119 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| 120 | int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
| 121 | { |
| 122 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); |
| 123 | } |
| 124 | #endif |
| 125 | |
| 126 | X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) |
| 127 | { |
| 128 | return(a->cert_info->issuer); |
| 129 | } |
| 130 | |
| 131 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) |
| 132 | { |
| 133 | return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
| 134 | } |
| 135 | |
| 136 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
| 137 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) |
| 138 | { |
| 139 | return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
| 140 | } |
| 141 | #endif |
| 142 | |
| 143 | X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) |
| 144 | { |
| 145 | return(a->cert_info->subject); |
| 146 | } |
| 147 | |
| 148 | ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) |
| 149 | { |
| 150 | return(a->cert_info->serialNumber); |
| 151 | } |
| 152 | |
| 153 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) |
| 154 | { |
| 155 | return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); |
| 156 | } |
| 157 | |
| 158 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
| 159 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) |
| 160 | { |
| 161 | return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); |
| 162 | } |
| 163 | #endif |
| 164 | |
| 165 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| 166 | /* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for |
| 167 | * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally |
| 168 | * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in |
| 169 | * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may |
| 170 | * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring |
| 171 | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point |
| 172 | * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt |
| 173 | * with an evil cast. |
| 174 | */ |
| 175 | int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| 176 | { |
| 177 | /* ensure hash is valid */ |
| 178 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); |
| 179 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); |
| 180 | |
| 181 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| 182 | } |
| 183 | #endif |
| 184 | |
| 185 | |
| 186 | int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) |
| 187 | { |
| 188 | int ret; |
| 189 | |
| 190 | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ |
| 191 | |
| 192 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) |
| 193 | { |
| 194 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); |
| 195 | if (ret < 0) |
| 196 | return -2; |
| 197 | } |
| 198 | |
| 199 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) |
| 200 | { |
| 201 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); |
| 202 | if (ret < 0) |
| 203 | return -2; |
| 204 | } |
| 205 | |
| 206 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
| 207 | |
| 208 | if (ret) |
| 209 | return ret; |
| 210 | |
| 211 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
| 212 | |
| 213 | } |
| 214 | |
| 215 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) |
| 216 | { |
| 217 | unsigned long ret=0; |
| 218 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| 219 | |
| 220 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
| 221 | i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL); |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 222 | EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL); |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 223 | |
| 224 | ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| |
| 225 | ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) |
| 226 | )&0xffffffffL; |
| 227 | return(ret); |
| 228 | } |
| 229 | |
| 230 | |
| 231 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
| 232 | /* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, |
| 233 | * this is reasonably efficient. */ |
| 234 | |
| 235 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) |
| 236 | { |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 237 | unsigned long ret=0; |
| 238 | unsigned char md[16]; |
| 239 | |
| 240 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
| 241 | i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL); |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 242 | EVP_Digest(x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length, md, NULL, EVP_md5(), NULL); |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 243 | |
| 244 | ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| |
| 245 | ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) |
| 246 | )&0xffffffffL; |
| 247 | return(ret); |
| 248 | } |
| 249 | #endif |
| 250 | |
| 251 | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ |
| 252 | X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, |
| 253 | ASN1_INTEGER *serial) |
| 254 | { |
| 255 | int i; |
| 256 | X509_CINF cinf; |
| 257 | X509 x,*x509=NULL; |
| 258 | |
| 259 | if(!sk) return NULL; |
| 260 | |
| 261 | x.cert_info= &cinf; |
| 262 | cinf.serialNumber=serial; |
| 263 | cinf.issuer=name; |
| 264 | |
| 265 | for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++) |
| 266 | { |
| 267 | x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i); |
| 268 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0) |
| 269 | return(x509); |
| 270 | } |
| 271 | return(NULL); |
| 272 | } |
| 273 | |
| 274 | X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) |
| 275 | { |
| 276 | X509 *x509; |
| 277 | int i; |
| 278 | |
| 279 | for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++) |
| 280 | { |
| 281 | x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i); |
| 282 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0) |
| 283 | return(x509); |
| 284 | } |
| 285 | return(NULL); |
| 286 | } |
| 287 | |
| 288 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) |
| 289 | { |
| 290 | if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) |
| 291 | return(NULL); |
| 292 | return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); |
| 293 | } |
| 294 | |
| 295 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) |
| 296 | { |
| 297 | if(!x) return NULL; |
| 298 | return x->cert_info->key->public_key; |
| 299 | } |
| 300 | |
| 301 | int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) |
| 302 | { |
| 303 | EVP_PKEY *xk; |
| 304 | int ret; |
| 305 | |
| 306 | xk=X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| 307 | |
| 308 | if (xk) |
| 309 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); |
| 310 | else |
| 311 | ret = -2; |
| 312 | |
| 313 | switch (ret) |
| 314 | { |
| 315 | case 1: |
| 316 | break; |
| 317 | case 0: |
| 318 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); |
| 319 | break; |
| 320 | case -1: |
| 321 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); |
| 322 | break; |
| 323 | case -2: |
| 324 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); |
| 325 | } |
| 326 | if (xk) |
| 327 | EVP_PKEY_free(xk); |
| 328 | if (ret > 0) |
| 329 | return 1; |
| 330 | return 0; |
| 331 | } |