Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ |
| 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| 3 | * All rights reserved. |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| 7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 8 | * |
| 9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 15 | * |
| 16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 17 | * the code are not to be removed. |
| 18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| 22 | * |
| 23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 25 | * are met: |
| 26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 40 | * |
| 41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 52 | * |
| 53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| 54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| 55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 57 | */ |
| 58 | /* ==================================================================== |
| 59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| 60 | * |
| 61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 63 | * are met: |
| 64 | * |
| 65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 67 | * |
| 68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 71 | * distribution. |
| 72 | * |
| 73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| 75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 77 | * |
| 78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| 79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| 81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| 82 | * |
| 83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| 84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| 85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| 86 | * |
| 87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| 88 | * acknowledgment: |
| 89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 91 | * |
| 92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| 93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| 95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| 96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| 97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| 99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| 101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| 103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 104 | * ==================================================================== |
| 105 | * |
| 106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| 107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| 108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 109 | * |
| 110 | */ |
| 111 | |
| 112 | #include <stdio.h> |
| 113 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
| 114 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 115 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| 116 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 117 | #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| 118 | |
| 119 | const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
| 120 | |
| 121 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 122 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, |
| 123 | const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, |
| 124 | SSL_SESSION **psess); |
| 125 | #endif |
| 126 | |
| 127 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ |
| 128 | tls1_enc, |
| 129 | tls1_mac, |
| 130 | tls1_setup_key_block, |
| 131 | tls1_generate_master_secret, |
| 132 | tls1_change_cipher_state, |
| 133 | tls1_final_finish_mac, |
| 134 | TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, |
| 135 | tls1_cert_verify_mac, |
| 136 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
| 137 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
| 138 | tls1_alert_code, |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 139 | }; |
| 140 | |
| 141 | long tls1_default_timeout(void) |
| 142 | { |
| 143 | /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec |
| 144 | * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ |
| 145 | return(60*60*2); |
| 146 | } |
| 147 | |
| 148 | int tls1_new(SSL *s) |
| 149 | { |
| 150 | if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); |
| 151 | s->method->ssl_clear(s); |
| 152 | return(1); |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | |
| 155 | void tls1_free(SSL *s) |
| 156 | { |
| 157 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 158 | if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) |
| 159 | { |
| 160 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); |
| 161 | } |
| 162 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ |
| 163 | ssl3_free(s); |
| 164 | } |
| 165 | |
| 166 | void tls1_clear(SSL *s) |
| 167 | { |
| 168 | ssl3_clear(s); |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 169 | s->version=TLS1_VERSION; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 170 | } |
| 171 | |
| 172 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 173 | static int nid_list[] = |
| 174 | { |
| 175 | NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
| 176 | NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ |
| 177 | NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ |
| 178 | NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
| 179 | NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ |
| 180 | NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ |
| 181 | NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ |
| 182 | NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
| 183 | NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
| 184 | NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ |
| 185 | NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ |
| 186 | NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ |
| 187 | NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ |
| 188 | NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ |
| 189 | NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ |
| 190 | NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ |
| 191 | NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ |
| 192 | NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ |
| 193 | NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ |
| 194 | NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ |
| 195 | NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ |
| 196 | NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ |
| 197 | NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
| 198 | NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
| 199 | NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
| 200 | }; |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 201 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 202 | int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) |
| 203 | { |
| 204 | /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ |
| 205 | if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > |
| 206 | sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) |
| 207 | return 0; |
| 208 | return nid_list[curve_id-1]; |
| 209 | } |
| 210 | |
| 211 | int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) |
| 212 | { |
| 213 | /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ |
| 214 | switch (nid) |
| 215 | { |
| 216 | case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
| 217 | return 1; |
| 218 | case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ |
| 219 | return 2; |
| 220 | case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ |
| 221 | return 3; |
| 222 | case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
| 223 | return 4; |
| 224 | case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ |
| 225 | return 5; |
| 226 | case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ |
| 227 | return 6; |
| 228 | case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ |
| 229 | return 7; |
| 230 | case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
| 231 | return 8; |
| 232 | case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
| 233 | return 9; |
| 234 | case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ |
| 235 | return 10; |
| 236 | case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ |
| 237 | return 11; |
| 238 | case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ |
| 239 | return 12; |
| 240 | case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ |
| 241 | return 13; |
| 242 | case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ |
| 243 | return 14; |
| 244 | case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ |
| 245 | return 15; |
| 246 | case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ |
| 247 | return 16; |
| 248 | case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ |
| 249 | return 17; |
| 250 | case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ |
| 251 | return 18; |
| 252 | case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ |
| 253 | return 19; |
| 254 | case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ |
| 255 | return 20; |
| 256 | case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ |
| 257 | return 21; |
| 258 | case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ |
| 259 | return 22; |
| 260 | case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
| 261 | return 23; |
| 262 | case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
| 263 | return 24; |
| 264 | case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
| 265 | return 25; |
| 266 | default: |
| 267 | return 0; |
| 268 | } |
| 269 | } |
| 270 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 271 | |
| 272 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 273 | unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) |
| 274 | { |
| 275 | int extdatalen=0; |
| 276 | unsigned char *ret = p; |
| 277 | |
| 278 | /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ |
| 279 | if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION |
| 280 | && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
| 281 | return p; |
| 282 | |
| 283 | ret+=2; |
| 284 | |
| 285 | if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ |
| 286 | |
| 287 | if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) |
| 288 | { |
| 289 | /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ |
| 290 | unsigned long size_str; |
| 291 | long lenmax; |
| 292 | |
| 293 | /* check for enough space. |
| 294 | 4 for the servername type and entension length |
| 295 | 2 for servernamelist length |
| 296 | 1 for the hostname type |
| 297 | 2 for hostname length |
| 298 | + hostname length |
| 299 | */ |
| 300 | |
| 301 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 |
| 302 | || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) |
| 303 | return NULL; |
| 304 | |
| 305 | /* extension type and length */ |
| 306 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); |
| 307 | s2n(size_str+5,ret); |
| 308 | |
| 309 | /* length of servername list */ |
| 310 | s2n(size_str+3,ret); |
| 311 | |
| 312 | /* hostname type, length and hostname */ |
| 313 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; |
| 314 | s2n(size_str,ret); |
| 315 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); |
| 316 | ret+=size_str; |
| 317 | } |
| 318 | |
| 319 | /* Add RI if renegotiating */ |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 320 | if (s->new_session) |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 321 | { |
| 322 | int el; |
| 323 | |
| 324 | if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) |
| 325 | { |
| 326 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 327 | return NULL; |
| 328 | } |
| 329 | |
| 330 | if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; |
| 331 | |
| 332 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); |
| 333 | s2n(el,ret); |
| 334 | |
| 335 | if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) |
| 336 | { |
| 337 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 338 | return NULL; |
| 339 | } |
| 340 | |
| 341 | ret += el; |
| 342 | } |
| 343 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 344 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 345 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && |
| 346 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 347 | { |
| 348 | /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ |
| 349 | long lenmax; |
| 350 | |
| 351 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; |
| 352 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; |
| 353 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) |
| 354 | { |
| 355 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 356 | return NULL; |
| 357 | } |
| 358 | |
| 359 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); |
| 360 | s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); |
| 361 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 362 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
| 363 | ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 364 | } |
| 365 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && |
| 366 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 367 | { |
| 368 | /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ |
| 369 | long lenmax; |
| 370 | |
| 371 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; |
| 372 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; |
| 373 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) |
| 374 | { |
| 375 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 376 | return NULL; |
| 377 | } |
| 378 | |
| 379 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); |
| 380 | s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); |
| 381 | |
| 382 | /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for |
| 383 | * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. |
| 384 | * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html |
| 385 | * resolves this to two bytes. |
| 386 | */ |
| 387 | s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); |
| 388 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); |
| 389 | ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; |
| 390 | } |
| 391 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 392 | |
| 393 | if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) |
| 394 | { |
| 395 | int ticklen; |
| 396 | if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) |
| 397 | ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; |
| 398 | else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && |
| 399 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) |
| 400 | { |
| 401 | ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; |
| 402 | s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); |
| 403 | if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) |
| 404 | return NULL; |
| 405 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, |
| 406 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, |
| 407 | ticklen); |
| 408 | s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; |
| 409 | } |
| 410 | else |
| 411 | ticklen = 0; |
| 412 | if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && |
| 413 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) |
| 414 | goto skip_ext; |
| 415 | /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len |
| 416 | * rest for ticket |
| 417 | */ |
| 418 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; |
| 419 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); |
| 420 | s2n(ticklen,ret); |
| 421 | if (ticklen) |
| 422 | { |
| 423 | memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); |
| 424 | ret += ticklen; |
| 425 | } |
| 426 | } |
| 427 | skip_ext: |
| 428 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 429 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 430 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
| 431 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 432 | { |
| 433 | size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| 434 | |
| 435 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) |
| 436 | return NULL; |
| 437 | if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ |
| 438 | return NULL; |
| 439 | |
| 440 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); |
| 441 | s2n(col + 2, ret); |
| 442 | s2n(col, ret); |
| 443 | memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); |
| 444 | ret += col; |
| 445 | } |
| 446 | #endif |
| 447 | |
| 448 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && |
| 449 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 450 | { |
| 451 | int i; |
| 452 | long extlen, idlen, itmp; |
| 453 | OCSP_RESPID *id; |
| 454 | |
| 455 | idlen = 0; |
| 456 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) |
| 457 | { |
| 458 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); |
| 459 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); |
| 460 | if (itmp <= 0) |
| 461 | return NULL; |
| 462 | idlen += itmp + 2; |
| 463 | } |
| 464 | |
| 465 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) |
| 466 | { |
| 467 | extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); |
| 468 | if (extlen < 0) |
| 469 | return NULL; |
| 470 | } |
| 471 | else |
| 472 | extlen = 0; |
| 473 | |
| 474 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; |
| 475 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); |
| 476 | if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) |
| 477 | return NULL; |
| 478 | s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); |
| 479 | *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; |
| 480 | s2n(idlen, ret); |
| 481 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) |
| 482 | { |
| 483 | /* save position of id len */ |
| 484 | unsigned char *q = ret; |
| 485 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); |
| 486 | /* skip over id len */ |
| 487 | ret += 2; |
| 488 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); |
| 489 | /* write id len */ |
| 490 | s2n(itmp, q); |
| 491 | } |
| 492 | s2n(extlen, ret); |
| 493 | if (extlen > 0) |
| 494 | i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); |
| 495 | } |
| 496 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 497 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 498 | if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) |
| 499 | { |
| 500 | /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its |
| 501 | * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ |
| 502 | if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) |
| 503 | return NULL; |
| 504 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); |
| 505 | s2n(0,ret); |
| 506 | } |
| 507 | #endif |
| 508 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 509 | if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) |
| 510 | return p; |
| 511 | |
| 512 | s2n(extdatalen,p); |
| 513 | return ret; |
| 514 | } |
| 515 | |
| 516 | unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) |
| 517 | { |
| 518 | int extdatalen=0; |
| 519 | unsigned char *ret = p; |
| 520 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 521 | int next_proto_neg_seen; |
| 522 | #endif |
| 523 | |
| 524 | /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ |
| 525 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
| 526 | return p; |
| 527 | |
| 528 | ret+=2; |
| 529 | if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ |
| 530 | |
| 531 | if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) |
| 532 | { |
| 533 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; |
| 534 | |
| 535 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); |
| 536 | s2n(0,ret); |
| 537 | } |
| 538 | |
| 539 | if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
| 540 | { |
| 541 | int el; |
| 542 | |
| 543 | if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) |
| 544 | { |
| 545 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 546 | return NULL; |
| 547 | } |
| 548 | |
| 549 | if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; |
| 550 | |
| 551 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); |
| 552 | s2n(el,ret); |
| 553 | |
| 554 | if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) |
| 555 | { |
| 556 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 557 | return NULL; |
| 558 | } |
| 559 | |
| 560 | ret += el; |
| 561 | } |
| 562 | |
| 563 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 564 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && |
| 565 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 566 | { |
| 567 | /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ |
| 568 | long lenmax; |
| 569 | |
| 570 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; |
| 571 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; |
| 572 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) |
| 573 | { |
| 574 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 575 | return NULL; |
| 576 | } |
| 577 | |
| 578 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); |
| 579 | s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); |
| 580 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 581 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
| 582 | ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 583 | |
| 584 | } |
| 585 | /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ |
| 586 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 587 | |
| 588 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected |
| 589 | && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) |
| 590 | { |
| 591 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; |
| 592 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); |
| 593 | s2n(0,ret); |
| 594 | } |
| 595 | |
| 596 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) |
| 597 | { |
| 598 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; |
| 599 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); |
| 600 | s2n(0,ret); |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | |
| 603 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 604 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
| 605 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 606 | { |
| 607 | size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| 608 | |
| 609 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) |
| 610 | return NULL; |
| 611 | if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ |
| 612 | return NULL; |
| 613 | |
| 614 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); |
| 615 | s2n(sol + 2, ret); |
| 616 | s2n(sol, ret); |
| 617 | memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); |
| 618 | ret += sol; |
| 619 | } |
| 620 | #endif |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 621 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) |
| 622 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) |
| 623 | { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { |
| 624 | 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ |
| 625 | 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ |
| 626 | 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, |
| 627 | 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, |
| 628 | 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, |
| 629 | 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; |
| 630 | if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; |
| 631 | memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); |
| 632 | ret+=36; |
| 633 | |
| 634 | } |
| 635 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 636 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 637 | next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; |
| 638 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
| 639 | if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) |
| 640 | { |
| 641 | const unsigned char *npa; |
| 642 | unsigned int npalen; |
| 643 | int r; |
| 644 | |
| 645 | r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); |
| 646 | if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) |
| 647 | { |
| 648 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; |
| 649 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); |
| 650 | s2n(npalen,ret); |
| 651 | memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); |
| 652 | ret += npalen; |
| 653 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
| 654 | } |
| 655 | } |
| 656 | #endif |
| 657 | |
| 658 | if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) |
| 659 | return p; |
| 660 | |
| 661 | s2n(extdatalen,p); |
| 662 | return ret; |
| 663 | } |
| 664 | |
| 665 | int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) |
| 666 | { |
| 667 | unsigned short type; |
| 668 | unsigned short size; |
| 669 | unsigned short len; |
| 670 | unsigned char *data = *p; |
| 671 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 672 | |
| 673 | s->servername_done = 0; |
| 674 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 675 | |
| 676 | if (data >= (d+n-2)) |
| 677 | goto ri_check; |
| 678 | n2s(data,len); |
| 679 | |
| 680 | if (data > (d+n-len)) |
| 681 | goto ri_check; |
| 682 | |
| 683 | while (data <= (d+n-4)) |
| 684 | { |
| 685 | n2s(data,type); |
| 686 | n2s(data,size); |
| 687 | |
| 688 | if (data+size > (d+n)) |
| 689 | goto ri_check; |
| 690 | #if 0 |
| 691 | fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); |
| 692 | #endif |
| 693 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) |
| 694 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, |
| 695 | s->tlsext_debug_arg); |
| 696 | /* The servername extension is treated as follows: |
| 697 | |
| 698 | - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. |
| 699 | - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, |
| 700 | in which case an fatal alert is generated. |
| 701 | - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. |
| 702 | - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order |
| 703 | to allow the application to position itself to the right context. |
| 704 | - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when |
| 705 | it is identical to a previously used for the same session. |
| 706 | Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time |
| 707 | set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the |
| 708 | case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and |
| 709 | a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername |
| 710 | presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches |
| 711 | the value of the Host: field. |
| 712 | - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION |
| 713 | if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, |
| 714 | i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. |
| 715 | - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. |
| 716 | |
| 717 | */ |
| 718 | |
| 719 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
| 720 | { |
| 721 | unsigned char *sdata; |
| 722 | int servname_type; |
| 723 | int dsize; |
| 724 | |
| 725 | if (size < 2) |
| 726 | { |
| 727 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 728 | return 0; |
| 729 | } |
| 730 | n2s(data,dsize); |
| 731 | size -= 2; |
| 732 | if (dsize > size ) |
| 733 | { |
| 734 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 735 | return 0; |
| 736 | } |
| 737 | |
| 738 | sdata = data; |
| 739 | while (dsize > 3) |
| 740 | { |
| 741 | servname_type = *(sdata++); |
| 742 | n2s(sdata,len); |
| 743 | dsize -= 3; |
| 744 | |
| 745 | if (len > dsize) |
| 746 | { |
| 747 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 748 | return 0; |
| 749 | } |
| 750 | if (s->servername_done == 0) |
| 751 | switch (servname_type) |
| 752 | { |
| 753 | case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: |
| 754 | if (!s->hit) |
| 755 | { |
| 756 | if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) |
| 757 | { |
| 758 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 759 | return 0; |
| 760 | } |
| 761 | if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) |
| 762 | { |
| 763 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 764 | return 0; |
| 765 | } |
| 766 | if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) |
| 767 | { |
| 768 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 769 | return 0; |
| 770 | } |
| 771 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); |
| 772 | s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; |
| 773 | if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { |
| 774 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); |
| 775 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; |
| 776 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 777 | return 0; |
| 778 | } |
| 779 | s->servername_done = 1; |
| 780 | |
| 781 | } |
| 782 | else |
| 783 | s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname |
| 784 | && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len |
| 785 | && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; |
| 786 | |
| 787 | break; |
| 788 | |
| 789 | default: |
| 790 | break; |
| 791 | } |
| 792 | |
| 793 | dsize -= len; |
| 794 | } |
| 795 | if (dsize != 0) |
| 796 | { |
| 797 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 798 | return 0; |
| 799 | } |
| 800 | |
| 801 | } |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 802 | |
| 803 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 804 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && |
| 805 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 806 | { |
| 807 | unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| 808 | int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); |
| 809 | |
| 810 | if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) |
| 811 | { |
| 812 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 813 | return 0; |
| 814 | } |
| 815 | if (!s->hit) |
| 816 | { |
| 817 | if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) |
| 818 | { |
| 819 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| 820 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; |
| 821 | } |
| 822 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; |
| 823 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) |
| 824 | { |
| 825 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 826 | return 0; |
| 827 | } |
| 828 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 829 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); |
| 830 | } |
| 831 | #if 0 |
| 832 | fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
| 833 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
| 834 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
| 835 | fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); |
| 836 | fprintf(stderr,"\n"); |
| 837 | #endif |
| 838 | } |
| 839 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && |
| 840 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 841 | { |
| 842 | unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| 843 | int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); |
| 844 | ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); |
| 845 | |
| 846 | if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2) |
| 847 | { |
| 848 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 849 | return 0; |
| 850 | } |
| 851 | if (!s->hit) |
| 852 | { |
| 853 | if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) |
| 854 | { |
| 855 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 856 | return 0; |
| 857 | } |
| 858 | s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; |
| 859 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) |
| 860 | { |
| 861 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 862 | return 0; |
| 863 | } |
| 864 | s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; |
| 865 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); |
| 866 | } |
| 867 | #if 0 |
| 868 | fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); |
| 869 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; |
| 870 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) |
| 871 | fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); |
| 872 | fprintf(stderr,"\n"); |
| 873 | #endif |
| 874 | } |
| 875 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 876 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 877 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && |
| 878 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 879 | { |
| 880 | unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| 881 | |
| 882 | if (size < 2) |
| 883 | { |
| 884 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 885 | return 0; |
| 886 | } |
| 887 | n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 888 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) |
| 889 | { |
| 890 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 891 | return 0; |
| 892 | } |
| 893 | |
| 894 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| 895 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); |
| 896 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
| 897 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| 898 | else |
| 899 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 900 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 901 | { |
| 902 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 903 | return 0; |
| 904 | } |
| 905 | } |
| 906 | #endif |
| 907 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) |
| 908 | { |
| 909 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && |
| 910 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) |
| 911 | { |
| 912 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 913 | return 0; |
| 914 | } |
| 915 | } |
| 916 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) |
| 917 | { |
| 918 | if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) |
| 919 | return 0; |
| 920 | renegotiate_seen = 1; |
| 921 | } |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 922 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && |
| 923 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) |
| 924 | { |
| 925 | |
| 926 | if (size < 5) |
| 927 | { |
| 928 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 929 | return 0; |
| 930 | } |
| 931 | |
| 932 | s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; |
| 933 | size--; |
| 934 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) |
| 935 | { |
| 936 | const unsigned char *sdata; |
| 937 | int dsize; |
| 938 | /* Read in responder_id_list */ |
| 939 | n2s(data,dsize); |
| 940 | size -= 2; |
| 941 | if (dsize > size ) |
| 942 | { |
| 943 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 944 | return 0; |
| 945 | } |
| 946 | while (dsize > 0) |
| 947 | { |
| 948 | OCSP_RESPID *id; |
| 949 | int idsize; |
| 950 | if (dsize < 4) |
| 951 | { |
| 952 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 953 | return 0; |
| 954 | } |
| 955 | n2s(data, idsize); |
| 956 | dsize -= 2 + idsize; |
| 957 | size -= 2 + idsize; |
| 958 | if (dsize < 0) |
| 959 | { |
| 960 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 961 | return 0; |
| 962 | } |
| 963 | sdata = data; |
| 964 | data += idsize; |
| 965 | id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, |
| 966 | &sdata, idsize); |
| 967 | if (!id) |
| 968 | { |
| 969 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 970 | return 0; |
| 971 | } |
| 972 | if (data != sdata) |
| 973 | { |
| 974 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
| 975 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 976 | return 0; |
| 977 | } |
| 978 | if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids |
| 979 | && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = |
| 980 | sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) |
| 981 | { |
| 982 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
| 983 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 984 | return 0; |
| 985 | } |
| 986 | if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( |
| 987 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) |
| 988 | { |
| 989 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
| 990 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 991 | return 0; |
| 992 | } |
| 993 | } |
| 994 | |
| 995 | /* Read in request_extensions */ |
| 996 | if (size < 2) |
| 997 | { |
| 998 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 999 | return 0; |
| 1000 | } |
| 1001 | n2s(data,dsize); |
| 1002 | size -= 2; |
| 1003 | if (dsize != size) |
| 1004 | { |
| 1005 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1006 | return 0; |
| 1007 | } |
| 1008 | sdata = data; |
| 1009 | if (dsize > 0) |
| 1010 | { |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1011 | s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = |
| 1012 | d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, |
| 1013 | &sdata, dsize); |
| 1014 | if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts |
| 1015 | || (data + dsize != sdata)) |
| 1016 | { |
| 1017 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1018 | return 0; |
| 1019 | } |
| 1020 | } |
| 1021 | } |
| 1022 | /* We don't know what to do with any other type |
| 1023 | * so ignore it. |
| 1024 | */ |
| 1025 | else |
| 1026 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
| 1027 | } |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1028 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 1029 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1030 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1031 | { |
| 1032 | /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a |
| 1033 | * renegotiation. |
| 1034 | * |
| 1035 | * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we |
| 1036 | * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on |
| 1037 | * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when |
| 1038 | * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an |
| 1039 | * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing |
| 1040 | * anything like that, but this might change). |
| 1041 | |
| 1042 | * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake |
| 1043 | * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > |
| 1044 | * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen |
| 1045 | * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new |
| 1046 | * Finished message could have been computed.) */ |
| 1047 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
| 1048 | } |
| 1049 | #endif |
| 1050 | |
| 1051 | /* session ticket processed earlier */ |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1052 | data+=size; |
| 1053 | } |
| 1054 | |
| 1055 | *p = data; |
| 1056 | |
| 1057 | ri_check: |
| 1058 | |
| 1059 | /* Need RI if renegotiating */ |
| 1060 | |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1061 | if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session && |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1062 | !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) |
| 1063 | { |
| 1064 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1065 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| 1066 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
| 1067 | return 0; |
| 1068 | } |
| 1069 | |
| 1070 | return 1; |
| 1071 | } |
| 1072 | |
| 1073 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 1074 | /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No |
| 1075 | * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill |
| 1076 | * the length of the block. */ |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1077 | static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1078 | { |
| 1079 | unsigned int off = 0; |
| 1080 | |
| 1081 | while (off < len) |
| 1082 | { |
| 1083 | if (d[off] == 0) |
| 1084 | return 0; |
| 1085 | off += d[off]; |
| 1086 | off++; |
| 1087 | } |
| 1088 | |
| 1089 | return off == len; |
| 1090 | } |
| 1091 | #endif |
| 1092 | |
| 1093 | int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) |
| 1094 | { |
| 1095 | unsigned short length; |
| 1096 | unsigned short type; |
| 1097 | unsigned short size; |
| 1098 | unsigned char *data = *p; |
| 1099 | int tlsext_servername = 0; |
| 1100 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; |
| 1101 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1102 | if (data >= (d+n-2)) |
| 1103 | goto ri_check; |
| 1104 | |
| 1105 | n2s(data,length); |
| 1106 | if (data+length != d+n) |
| 1107 | { |
| 1108 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1109 | return 0; |
| 1110 | } |
| 1111 | |
| 1112 | while(data <= (d+n-4)) |
| 1113 | { |
| 1114 | n2s(data,type); |
| 1115 | n2s(data,size); |
| 1116 | |
| 1117 | if (data+size > (d+n)) |
| 1118 | goto ri_check; |
| 1119 | |
| 1120 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) |
| 1121 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, |
| 1122 | s->tlsext_debug_arg); |
| 1123 | |
| 1124 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
| 1125 | { |
| 1126 | if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) |
| 1127 | { |
| 1128 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 1129 | return 0; |
| 1130 | } |
| 1131 | tlsext_servername = 1; |
| 1132 | } |
| 1133 | |
| 1134 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 1135 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && |
| 1136 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 1137 | { |
| 1138 | unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| 1139 | int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); |
| 1140 | |
| 1141 | if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) |
| 1142 | { |
| 1143 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1144 | return 0; |
| 1145 | } |
| 1146 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; |
| 1147 | if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| 1148 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) |
| 1149 | { |
| 1150 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1151 | return 0; |
| 1152 | } |
| 1153 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 1154 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); |
| 1155 | #if 0 |
| 1156 | fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); |
| 1157 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
| 1158 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
| 1159 | fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); |
| 1160 | fprintf(stderr,"\n"); |
| 1161 | #endif |
| 1162 | } |
| 1163 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 1164 | |
| 1165 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) |
| 1166 | { |
| 1167 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && |
| 1168 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) |
| 1169 | { |
| 1170 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1171 | return 0; |
| 1172 | } |
| 1173 | if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) |
| 1174 | || (size > 0)) |
| 1175 | { |
| 1176 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| 1177 | return 0; |
| 1178 | } |
| 1179 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
| 1180 | } |
| 1181 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 1182 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && |
| 1183 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 1184 | { |
| 1185 | unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| 1186 | |
| 1187 | if (size < 2) |
| 1188 | { |
| 1189 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1190 | return 0; |
| 1191 | } |
| 1192 | n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 1193 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) |
| 1194 | { |
| 1195 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1196 | return 0; |
| 1197 | } |
| 1198 | |
| 1199 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| 1200 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); |
| 1201 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
| 1202 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| 1203 | else |
| 1204 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 1205 | |
| 1206 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 1207 | { |
| 1208 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1209 | return 0; |
| 1210 | } |
| 1211 | } |
| 1212 | #endif |
| 1213 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && |
| 1214 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 1215 | { |
| 1216 | /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested |
| 1217 | * a status request message. |
| 1218 | */ |
| 1219 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) |
| 1220 | { |
| 1221 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| 1222 | return 0; |
| 1223 | } |
| 1224 | /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ |
| 1225 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; |
| 1226 | } |
| 1227 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1228 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1229 | { |
| 1230 | unsigned char *selected; |
| 1231 | unsigned char selected_len; |
| 1232 | |
| 1233 | /* We must have requested it. */ |
| 1234 | if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)) |
| 1235 | { |
| 1236 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| 1237 | return 0; |
| 1238 | } |
| 1239 | /* The data must be valid */ |
| 1240 | if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) |
| 1241 | { |
| 1242 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1243 | return 0; |
| 1244 | } |
| 1245 | if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) |
| 1246 | { |
| 1247 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1248 | return 0; |
| 1249 | } |
| 1250 | s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); |
| 1251 | if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) |
| 1252 | { |
| 1253 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1254 | return 0; |
| 1255 | } |
| 1256 | memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); |
| 1257 | s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1258 | } |
| 1259 | #endif |
| 1260 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) |
| 1261 | { |
| 1262 | if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) |
| 1263 | return 0; |
| 1264 | renegotiate_seen = 1; |
| 1265 | } |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1266 | data+=size; |
| 1267 | } |
| 1268 | |
| 1269 | if (data != d+n) |
| 1270 | { |
| 1271 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1272 | return 0; |
| 1273 | } |
| 1274 | |
| 1275 | if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) |
| 1276 | { |
| 1277 | if (s->tlsext_hostname) |
| 1278 | { |
| 1279 | if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) |
| 1280 | { |
| 1281 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); |
| 1282 | if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) |
| 1283 | { |
| 1284 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 1285 | return 0; |
| 1286 | } |
| 1287 | } |
| 1288 | else |
| 1289 | { |
| 1290 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1291 | return 0; |
| 1292 | } |
| 1293 | } |
| 1294 | } |
| 1295 | |
| 1296 | *p = data; |
| 1297 | |
| 1298 | ri_check: |
| 1299 | |
| 1300 | /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to |
| 1301 | * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server |
| 1302 | * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an |
| 1303 | * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server |
| 1304 | * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI |
| 1305 | * absence on initial connect only. |
| 1306 | */ |
| 1307 | if (!renegotiate_seen |
| 1308 | && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) |
| 1309 | && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) |
| 1310 | { |
| 1311 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1312 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| 1313 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
| 1314 | return 0; |
| 1315 | } |
| 1316 | |
| 1317 | return 1; |
| 1318 | } |
| 1319 | |
| 1320 | |
| 1321 | int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
| 1322 | { |
| 1323 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 1324 | /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats |
| 1325 | * and elliptic curves we support. |
| 1326 | */ |
| 1327 | int using_ecc = 0; |
| 1328 | int i; |
| 1329 | unsigned char *j; |
| 1330 | unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; |
| 1331 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
| 1332 | |
| 1333 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) |
| 1334 | { |
| 1335 | SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); |
| 1336 | |
| 1337 | alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1338 | alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; |
| 1339 | if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) |
| 1340 | { |
| 1341 | using_ecc = 1; |
| 1342 | break; |
| 1343 | } |
| 1344 | } |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1345 | using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION); |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1346 | if (using_ecc) |
| 1347 | { |
| 1348 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| 1349 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) |
| 1350 | { |
| 1351 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1352 | return -1; |
| 1353 | } |
| 1354 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; |
| 1355 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; |
| 1356 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; |
| 1357 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; |
| 1358 | |
| 1359 | /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ |
| 1360 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1361 | s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1362 | if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) |
| 1363 | { |
| 1364 | s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; |
| 1365 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1366 | return -1; |
| 1367 | } |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1368 | for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <= |
| 1369 | sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++) |
| 1370 | s2n(i,j); |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1371 | } |
| 1372 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 1373 | |
| 1374 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 1375 | { |
| 1376 | int r = 1; |
| 1377 | |
| 1378 | if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) |
| 1379 | { |
| 1380 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); |
| 1381 | if (!r) |
| 1382 | return -1; |
| 1383 | } |
| 1384 | |
| 1385 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) |
| 1386 | { |
| 1387 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| 1388 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); |
| 1389 | |
| 1390 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
| 1391 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| 1392 | else |
| 1393 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 1394 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 1395 | { |
| 1396 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1397 | return -1; |
| 1398 | } |
| 1399 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| 1400 | } |
| 1401 | |
| 1402 | if (r == 2) |
| 1403 | /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ |
| 1404 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| 1405 | } |
| 1406 | #endif |
| 1407 | |
| 1408 | return 1; |
| 1409 | } |
| 1410 | |
| 1411 | int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
| 1412 | { |
| 1413 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 1414 | /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support |
| 1415 | * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not |
| 1416 | * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. |
| 1417 | */ |
| 1418 | |
| 1419 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1420 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| 1421 | int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); |
| 1422 | using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); |
| 1423 | |
| 1424 | if (using_ecc) |
| 1425 | { |
| 1426 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| 1427 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) |
| 1428 | { |
| 1429 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1430 | return -1; |
| 1431 | } |
| 1432 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; |
| 1433 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; |
| 1434 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; |
| 1435 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; |
| 1436 | } |
| 1437 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 1438 | |
| 1439 | return 1; |
| 1440 | } |
| 1441 | |
| 1442 | int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
| 1443 | { |
| 1444 | int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| 1445 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 1446 | |
| 1447 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 1448 | /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in |
| 1449 | * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. |
| 1450 | */ |
| 1451 | /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in |
| 1452 | * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. |
| 1453 | */ |
| 1454 | #endif |
| 1455 | |
| 1456 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| 1457 | ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| 1458 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| 1459 | ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| 1460 | |
| 1461 | /* If status request then ask callback what to do. |
| 1462 | * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case |
| 1463 | * the certificate has changed. |
| 1464 | */ |
| 1465 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) |
| 1466 | { |
| 1467 | int r; |
| 1468 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); |
| 1469 | switch (r) |
| 1470 | { |
| 1471 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ |
| 1472 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
| 1473 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| 1474 | break; |
| 1475 | /* status request response should be sent */ |
| 1476 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: |
| 1477 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) |
| 1478 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; |
| 1479 | else |
| 1480 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| 1481 | break; |
| 1482 | /* something bad happened */ |
| 1483 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| 1484 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1485 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1486 | goto err; |
| 1487 | } |
| 1488 | } |
| 1489 | else |
| 1490 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| 1491 | |
| 1492 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 1493 | { |
| 1494 | /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), |
| 1495 | * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, |
| 1496 | * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */ |
| 1497 | |
| 1498 | int r = 1; |
| 1499 | |
| 1500 | if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) |
| 1501 | { |
| 1502 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); |
| 1503 | if (!r) |
| 1504 | { |
| 1505 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1506 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1507 | goto err; |
| 1508 | } |
| 1509 | } |
| 1510 | |
| 1511 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| 1512 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); |
| 1513 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; |
| 1514 | |
| 1515 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) |
| 1516 | { |
| 1517 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
| 1518 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) |
| 1519 | { |
| 1520 | /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input |
| 1521 | * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ |
| 1522 | |
| 1523 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
| 1524 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| 1525 | else |
| 1526 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 1527 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 1528 | { |
| 1529 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1530 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1531 | goto err; |
| 1532 | } |
| 1533 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| 1534 | } |
| 1535 | } |
| 1536 | |
| 1537 | if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 1538 | { |
| 1539 | /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, |
| 1540 | * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; |
| 1541 | * abort the handshake. |
| 1542 | */ |
| 1543 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1544 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1545 | } |
| 1546 | } |
| 1547 | |
| 1548 | #endif |
| 1549 | err: |
| 1550 | switch (ret) |
| 1551 | { |
| 1552 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| 1553 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 1554 | return -1; |
| 1555 | |
| 1556 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
| 1557 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); |
| 1558 | return 1; |
| 1559 | |
| 1560 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
| 1561 | s->servername_done=0; |
| 1562 | default: |
| 1563 | return 1; |
| 1564 | } |
| 1565 | } |
| 1566 | |
| 1567 | int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
| 1568 | { |
| 1569 | int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| 1570 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 1571 | |
| 1572 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 1573 | /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher |
| 1574 | * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension |
| 1575 | * it must contain uncompressed. |
| 1576 | */ |
| 1577 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1578 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| 1579 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && |
| 1580 | (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && |
| 1581 | ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) |
| 1582 | { |
| 1583 | /* we are using an ECC cipher */ |
| 1584 | size_t i; |
| 1585 | unsigned char *list; |
| 1586 | int found_uncompressed = 0; |
| 1587 | list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
| 1588 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
| 1589 | { |
| 1590 | if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) |
| 1591 | { |
| 1592 | found_uncompressed = 1; |
| 1593 | break; |
| 1594 | } |
| 1595 | } |
| 1596 | if (!found_uncompressed) |
| 1597 | { |
| 1598 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); |
| 1599 | return -1; |
| 1600 | } |
| 1601 | } |
| 1602 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| 1603 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 1604 | |
| 1605 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| 1606 | ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| 1607 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| 1608 | ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| 1609 | |
| 1610 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 1611 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) |
| 1612 | { |
| 1613 | /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. |
| 1614 | * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ |
| 1615 | |
| 1616 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 1617 | { |
| 1618 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1619 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1620 | } |
| 1621 | |
| 1622 | /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check |
| 1623 | * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ |
| 1624 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || |
| 1625 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) |
| 1626 | { |
| 1627 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1628 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1629 | } |
| 1630 | } |
| 1631 | #endif |
| 1632 | |
| 1633 | /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one |
| 1634 | * tell the callback |
| 1635 | */ |
| 1636 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) |
| 1637 | && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) |
| 1638 | { |
| 1639 | int r; |
| 1640 | /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows |
| 1641 | * there is no response. |
| 1642 | */ |
| 1643 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) |
| 1644 | { |
| 1645 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); |
| 1646 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; |
| 1647 | } |
| 1648 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; |
| 1649 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); |
| 1650 | if (r == 0) |
| 1651 | { |
| 1652 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; |
| 1653 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1654 | } |
| 1655 | if (r < 0) |
| 1656 | { |
| 1657 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1658 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1659 | } |
| 1660 | } |
| 1661 | |
| 1662 | switch (ret) |
| 1663 | { |
| 1664 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| 1665 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 1666 | return -1; |
| 1667 | |
| 1668 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
| 1669 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); |
| 1670 | return 1; |
| 1671 | |
| 1672 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
| 1673 | s->servername_done=0; |
| 1674 | default: |
| 1675 | return 1; |
| 1676 | } |
| 1677 | } |
| 1678 | |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1679 | /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client |
| 1680 | * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS |
| 1681 | * session ticket extension at the same time. |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1682 | */ |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1683 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1684 | int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1685 | const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1686 | { |
| 1687 | /* Point after session ID in client hello */ |
| 1688 | const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; |
| 1689 | unsigned short i; |
| 1690 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1691 | /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1692 | * to permit stateful resumption. |
| 1693 | */ |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1694 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1695 | return 1; |
| 1696 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1697 | if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1698 | return 1; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1699 | if (p >= limit) |
| 1700 | return -1; |
| 1701 | /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ |
| 1702 | if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| 1703 | { |
| 1704 | i = *(p++); |
| 1705 | p+= i; |
| 1706 | if (p >= limit) |
| 1707 | return -1; |
| 1708 | } |
| 1709 | /* Skip past cipher list */ |
| 1710 | n2s(p, i); |
| 1711 | p+= i; |
| 1712 | if (p >= limit) |
| 1713 | return -1; |
| 1714 | /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ |
| 1715 | i = *(p++); |
| 1716 | p += i; |
| 1717 | if (p > limit) |
| 1718 | return -1; |
| 1719 | /* Now at start of extensions */ |
| 1720 | if ((p + 2) >= limit) |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1721 | return 1; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1722 | n2s(p, i); |
| 1723 | while ((p + 4) <= limit) |
| 1724 | { |
| 1725 | unsigned short type, size; |
| 1726 | n2s(p, type); |
| 1727 | n2s(p, size); |
| 1728 | if (p + size > limit) |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1729 | return 1; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1730 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) |
| 1731 | { |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1732 | /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will |
| 1733 | * trigger a full handshake |
| 1734 | */ |
| 1735 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) |
| 1736 | return 1; |
| 1737 | /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket |
| 1738 | * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake |
| 1739 | */ |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1740 | if (size == 0) |
| 1741 | { |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1742 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1743 | return 0; /* Cache miss */ |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1744 | } |
| 1745 | if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) |
| 1746 | { |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1747 | /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of |
| 1748 | * generating the session from ticket now, |
| 1749 | * trigger abbreviated handshake based on |
| 1750 | * external mechanism to calculate the master |
| 1751 | * secret later. */ |
| 1752 | return 0; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1753 | } |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1754 | return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, |
| 1755 | ret); |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1756 | } |
| 1757 | p += size; |
| 1758 | } |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1759 | return 1; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1760 | } |
| 1761 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1762 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, |
| 1763 | const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, |
| 1764 | SSL_SESSION **psess) |
| 1765 | { |
| 1766 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| 1767 | unsigned char *sdec; |
| 1768 | const unsigned char *p; |
| 1769 | int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; |
| 1770 | unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 1771 | HMAC_CTX hctx; |
| 1772 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; |
| 1773 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; |
| 1774 | /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ |
| 1775 | if (eticklen < 48) |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1776 | goto tickerr; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1777 | /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ |
| 1778 | HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); |
| 1779 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| 1780 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) |
| 1781 | { |
| 1782 | unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; |
| 1783 | int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, |
| 1784 | &ctx, &hctx, 0); |
| 1785 | if (rv < 0) |
| 1786 | return -1; |
| 1787 | if (rv == 0) |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1788 | goto tickerr; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1789 | if (rv == 2) |
| 1790 | renew_ticket = 1; |
| 1791 | } |
| 1792 | else |
| 1793 | { |
| 1794 | /* Check key name matches */ |
| 1795 | if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1796 | goto tickerr; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1797 | HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, |
| 1798 | tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); |
| 1799 | EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, |
| 1800 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); |
| 1801 | } |
| 1802 | /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1803 | * integrity checks on ticket. |
| 1804 | */ |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1805 | mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); |
| 1806 | if (mlen < 0) |
| 1807 | { |
| 1808 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 1809 | return -1; |
| 1810 | } |
| 1811 | eticklen -= mlen; |
| 1812 | /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ |
| 1813 | HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); |
| 1814 | HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); |
| 1815 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); |
| 1816 | if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1817 | goto tickerr; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1818 | /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ |
| 1819 | /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ |
| 1820 | p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
| 1821 | eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
| 1822 | sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); |
| 1823 | if (!sdec) |
| 1824 | { |
| 1825 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 1826 | return -1; |
| 1827 | } |
| 1828 | EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); |
| 1829 | if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1830 | goto tickerr; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1831 | slen += mlen; |
| 1832 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 1833 | p = sdec; |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1834 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1835 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); |
| 1836 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); |
| 1837 | if (sess) |
| 1838 | { |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1839 | /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to |
| 1840 | * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to |
| 1841 | * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero |
| 1842 | * as required by standard. |
| 1843 | */ |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1844 | if (sesslen) |
| 1845 | memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); |
| 1846 | sess->session_id_length = sesslen; |
| 1847 | *psess = sess; |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1848 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1849 | return 1; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1850 | } |
Alexandre Savard | 7541067 | 2012-08-08 09:50:01 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1851 | /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to |
| 1852 | * send a new ticket |
| 1853 | */ |
| 1854 | tickerr: |
| 1855 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1856 | return 0; |
| 1857 | } |
| 1858 | |
Alexandre Savard | 1b09e31 | 2012-08-07 20:33:29 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1859 | #endif |