Tristan Matthews | 0a329cc | 2013-07-17 13:20:14 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* |
| 2 | * xfm.c |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Crypto transform implementation |
| 5 | * |
| 6 | * David A. McGrew |
| 7 | * Cisco Systems, Inc. |
| 8 | */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #include "cryptoalg.h" |
| 11 | #include "aes_cbc.h" |
| 12 | #include "hmac.h" |
| 13 | #include "crypto_kernel.h" /* for crypto_get_random() */ |
| 14 | |
| 15 | #define KEY_LEN 16 |
| 16 | #define ENC_KEY_LEN 16 |
| 17 | #define MAC_KEY_LEN 16 |
| 18 | #define IV_LEN 16 |
| 19 | #define TAG_LEN 12 |
| 20 | #define MAX_EXPAND 27 |
| 21 | |
| 22 | err_status_t |
| 23 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_func(void *key, |
| 24 | void *clear, |
| 25 | unsigned clear_len, |
| 26 | void *iv, |
| 27 | void *opaque, |
| 28 | unsigned *opaque_len, |
| 29 | void *auth_tag) { |
| 30 | aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
| 31 | hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
| 32 | unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
| 33 | unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
| 34 | err_status_t status; |
| 35 | |
| 36 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
| 37 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 38 | |
| 39 | /* perform authentication only */ |
| 40 | |
| 41 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 42 | |
| 43 | /* |
| 44 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
| 45 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
| 46 | */ |
| 47 | return err_status_fail; |
| 48 | |
| 49 | } else { |
| 50 | |
| 51 | /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
| 52 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
| 53 | if (status) return status; |
| 54 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
| 55 | if (status) return status; |
| 56 | |
| 57 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
| 58 | if (status) return status; |
| 59 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
| 60 | if (status) return status; |
| 61 | |
| 62 | |
| 63 | /* perform encryption and authentication */ |
| 64 | |
| 65 | /* set aes key */ |
| 66 | status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, direction_encrypt); |
| 67 | if (status) return status; |
| 68 | |
| 69 | /* set iv */ |
| 70 | status = crypto_get_random(iv, IV_LEN); |
| 71 | if (status) return status; |
| 72 | status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
| 73 | |
| 74 | /* encrypt the opaque data */ |
| 75 | status = aes_cbc_nist_encrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, opaque_len); |
| 76 | if (status) return status; |
| 77 | |
| 78 | /* authenticate clear and opaque data */ |
| 79 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
| 80 | if (status) return status; |
| 81 | |
| 82 | status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
| 83 | if (status) return status; |
| 84 | |
| 85 | status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
| 86 | if (status) return status; |
| 87 | |
| 88 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, *opaque_len, TAG_LEN, auth_tag); |
| 89 | if (status) return status; |
| 90 | |
| 91 | } |
| 92 | |
| 93 | return err_status_ok; |
| 94 | } |
| 95 | |
| 96 | err_status_t |
| 97 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_inv(void *key, |
| 98 | void *clear, |
| 99 | unsigned clear_len, |
| 100 | void *iv, |
| 101 | void *opaque, |
| 102 | unsigned *opaque_len, |
| 103 | void *auth_tag) { |
| 104 | aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
| 105 | hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
| 106 | unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
| 107 | unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
| 108 | unsigned char tmp_tag[TAG_LEN]; |
| 109 | unsigned char *tag = auth_tag; |
| 110 | err_status_t status; |
| 111 | int i; |
| 112 | |
| 113 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
| 114 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 115 | |
| 116 | /* perform authentication only */ |
| 117 | |
| 118 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 119 | |
| 120 | /* |
| 121 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
| 122 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
| 123 | */ |
| 124 | return err_status_fail; |
| 125 | |
| 126 | } else { |
| 127 | |
| 128 | /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
| 129 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
| 130 | if (status) return status; |
| 131 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
| 132 | if (status) return status; |
| 133 | |
| 134 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
| 135 | if (status) return status; |
| 136 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
| 137 | if (status) return status; |
| 138 | |
| 139 | /* perform encryption and authentication */ |
| 140 | |
| 141 | /* set aes key */ |
| 142 | status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, direction_decrypt); |
| 143 | if (status) return status; |
| 144 | |
| 145 | /* set iv */ |
| 146 | status = rand_source_get_octet_string(iv, IV_LEN); |
| 147 | if (status) return status; |
| 148 | status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
| 149 | |
| 150 | /* encrypt the opaque data */ |
| 151 | status = aes_cbc_nist_decrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, opaque_len); |
| 152 | if (status) return status; |
| 153 | |
| 154 | /* authenticate clear and opaque data */ |
| 155 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
| 156 | if (status) return status; |
| 157 | |
| 158 | status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
| 159 | if (status) return status; |
| 160 | |
| 161 | status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
| 162 | if (status) return status; |
| 163 | |
| 164 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, *opaque_len, TAG_LEN, tmp_tag); |
| 165 | if (status) return status; |
| 166 | |
| 167 | /* compare the computed tag with the one provided as input */ |
| 168 | for (i=0; i < TAG_LEN; i++) |
| 169 | if (tmp_tag[i] != tag[i]) |
| 170 | return err_status_auth_fail; |
| 171 | |
| 172 | } |
| 173 | |
| 174 | return err_status_ok; |
| 175 | } |
| 176 | |
| 177 | |
| 178 | #define ENC 1 |
| 179 |
|
| 180 | // eVC4 declares DEBUG
|
| 181 | #undef DEBUG
|
| 182 | |
| 183 | #define DEBUG 0 |
| 184 | |
| 185 | err_status_t |
| 186 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_enc(void *key, |
| 187 | const void *clear, |
| 188 | unsigned clear_len, |
| 189 | void *iv, |
| 190 | void *opaque, |
| 191 | unsigned *opaque_len) { |
| 192 | aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
| 193 | hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
| 194 | unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
| 195 | unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
| 196 | unsigned char *auth_tag; |
| 197 | err_status_t status; |
| 198 | |
| 199 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
| 200 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 201 | |
| 202 | /* perform authentication only */ |
| 203 | |
| 204 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 205 | |
| 206 | /* |
| 207 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
| 208 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
| 209 | */ |
| 210 | return err_status_fail; |
| 211 | |
| 212 | } else { |
| 213 | |
| 214 | #if DEBUG |
| 215 | printf("ENC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
| 216 | #endif |
| 217 | |
| 218 | /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
| 219 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
| 220 | if (status) return status; |
| 221 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
| 222 | if (status) return status; |
| 223 | |
| 224 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
| 225 | if (status) return status; |
| 226 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
| 227 | if (status) return status; |
| 228 | |
| 229 | |
| 230 | /* perform encryption and authentication */ |
| 231 | |
| 232 | /* set aes key */ |
| 233 | status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, direction_encrypt); |
| 234 | if (status) return status; |
| 235 | |
| 236 | /* set iv */ |
| 237 | status = rand_source_get_octet_string(iv, IV_LEN); |
| 238 | if (status) return status; |
| 239 | status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
| 240 | if (status) return status; |
| 241 | |
| 242 | #if DEBUG |
| 243 | printf("plaintext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
| 244 | printf("iv: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
| 245 | printf("plaintext: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
| 246 | #endif |
| 247 | |
| 248 | #if ENC |
| 249 | /* encrypt the opaque data */ |
| 250 | status = aes_cbc_nist_encrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, opaque_len); |
| 251 | if (status) return status; |
| 252 | #endif |
| 253 | |
| 254 | #if DEBUG |
| 255 | printf("ciphertext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
| 256 | printf("ciphertext: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
| 257 | #endif |
| 258 | |
| 259 | /* |
| 260 | * authenticate clear and opaque data, then write the |
| 261 | * authentication tag to the location immediately following the |
| 262 | * ciphertext |
| 263 | */ |
| 264 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
| 265 | if (status) return status; |
| 266 | |
| 267 | status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
| 268 | if (status) return status; |
| 269 | |
| 270 | status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
| 271 | if (status) return status; |
| 272 | #if DEBUG |
| 273 | printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
| 274 | octet_string_hex_string(clear, clear_len)); |
| 275 | #endif |
| 276 | auth_tag = (unsigned char *)opaque; |
| 277 | auth_tag += *opaque_len; |
| 278 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, *opaque_len, TAG_LEN, auth_tag); |
| 279 | if (status) return status; |
| 280 | #if DEBUG |
| 281 | printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
| 282 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
| 283 | #endif |
| 284 | /* bump up the opaque_len to reflect the authentication tag */ |
| 285 | *opaque_len += TAG_LEN; |
| 286 | |
| 287 | #if DEBUG |
| 288 | printf("prot data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
| 289 | printf("prot data: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
| 290 | #endif |
| 291 | } |
| 292 | |
| 293 | return err_status_ok; |
| 294 | } |
| 295 | |
| 296 | err_status_t |
| 297 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_dec(void *key, |
| 298 | const void *clear, |
| 299 | unsigned clear_len, |
| 300 | void *iv, |
| 301 | void *opaque, |
| 302 | unsigned *opaque_len) { |
| 303 | aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
| 304 | hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
| 305 | unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
| 306 | unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
| 307 | unsigned char tmp_tag[TAG_LEN]; |
| 308 | unsigned char *auth_tag; |
| 309 | unsigned ciphertext_len; |
| 310 | err_status_t status; |
| 311 | int i; |
| 312 | |
| 313 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
| 314 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 315 | |
| 316 | /* perform authentication only */ |
| 317 | |
| 318 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 319 | |
| 320 | /* |
| 321 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
| 322 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
| 323 | */ |
| 324 | return err_status_fail; |
| 325 | |
| 326 | } else { |
| 327 | #if DEBUG |
| 328 | printf("DEC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
| 329 | #endif |
| 330 | |
| 331 | /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
| 332 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
| 333 | if (status) return status; |
| 334 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
| 335 | if (status) return status; |
| 336 | |
| 337 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
| 338 | if (status) return status; |
| 339 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
| 340 | if (status) return status; |
| 341 | |
| 342 | #if DEBUG |
| 343 | printf("prot data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
| 344 | printf("prot data: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
| 345 | #endif |
| 346 | |
| 347 | /* |
| 348 | * set the protected data length to that of the ciphertext, by |
| 349 | * subtracting out the length of the authentication tag |
| 350 | */ |
| 351 | ciphertext_len = *opaque_len - TAG_LEN; |
| 352 | |
| 353 | #if DEBUG |
| 354 | printf("ciphertext len: %d\n", ciphertext_len); |
| 355 | #endif |
| 356 | /* verify the authentication tag */ |
| 357 | |
| 358 | /* |
| 359 | * compute the authentication tag for the clear and opaque data, |
| 360 | * and write it to a temporary location |
| 361 | */ |
| 362 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
| 363 | if (status) return status; |
| 364 | |
| 365 | status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
| 366 | if (status) return status; |
| 367 | |
| 368 | status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
| 369 | if (status) return status; |
| 370 | |
| 371 | #if DEBUG |
| 372 | printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
| 373 | octet_string_hex_string(clear, clear_len)); |
| 374 | #endif |
| 375 | |
| 376 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, ciphertext_len, TAG_LEN, tmp_tag); |
| 377 | if (status) return status; |
| 378 | |
| 379 | #if DEBUG |
| 380 | printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
| 381 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, ciphertext_len)); |
| 382 | #endif |
| 383 | |
| 384 | /* |
| 385 | * compare the computed tag with the one provided as input (which |
| 386 | * immediately follows the ciphertext) |
| 387 | */ |
| 388 | auth_tag = (unsigned char *)opaque; |
| 389 | auth_tag += ciphertext_len; |
| 390 | #if DEBUG |
| 391 | printf("auth_tag: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(auth_tag, TAG_LEN)); |
| 392 | printf("tmp_tag: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(tmp_tag, TAG_LEN)); |
| 393 | #endif |
| 394 | for (i=0; i < TAG_LEN; i++) { |
| 395 | if (tmp_tag[i] != auth_tag[i]) |
| 396 | return err_status_auth_fail; |
| 397 | } |
| 398 | |
| 399 | /* bump down the opaque_len to reflect the authentication tag */ |
| 400 | *opaque_len -= TAG_LEN; |
| 401 | |
| 402 | /* decrypt the confidential data */ |
| 403 | status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, direction_decrypt); |
| 404 | if (status) return status; |
| 405 | status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
| 406 | if (status) return status; |
| 407 | |
| 408 | #if DEBUG |
| 409 | printf("ciphertext: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
| 410 | printf("iv: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
| 411 | #endif |
| 412 | |
| 413 | #if ENC |
| 414 | status = aes_cbc_nist_decrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, &ciphertext_len); |
| 415 | if (status) return status; |
| 416 | #endif |
| 417 | |
| 418 | #if DEBUG |
| 419 | printf("plaintext len: %d\n", ciphertext_len); |
| 420 | printf("plaintext: %s\n", |
| 421 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, ciphertext_len)); |
| 422 | #endif |
| 423 | |
| 424 | /* indicate the length of the plaintext */ |
| 425 | *opaque_len = ciphertext_len; |
| 426 | } |
| 427 | |
| 428 | return err_status_ok; |
| 429 | } |
| 430 | |
| 431 | cryptoalg_ctx_t cryptoalg_ctx = { |
| 432 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_enc, |
| 433 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_dec, |
| 434 | KEY_LEN, |
| 435 | IV_LEN, |
| 436 | TAG_LEN, |
| 437 | MAX_EXPAND, |
| 438 | }; |
| 439 | |
| 440 | cryptoalg_t cryptoalg = &cryptoalg_ctx; |
| 441 | |
| 442 | #define NULL_TAG_LEN 12 |
| 443 | |
| 444 | err_status_t |
| 445 | null_enc(void *key, |
| 446 | const void *clear, |
| 447 | unsigned clear_len, |
| 448 | void *iv, |
| 449 | void *opaque, |
| 450 | unsigned *opaque_len) { |
| 451 | int i; |
| 452 | unsigned char *auth_tag; |
| 453 | unsigned char *init_vec = iv; |
| 454 | |
| 455 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
| 456 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 457 | |
| 458 | /* perform authentication only */ |
| 459 | |
| 460 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 461 | |
| 462 | /* |
| 463 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
| 464 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
| 465 | */ |
| 466 | return err_status_fail; |
| 467 | |
| 468 | } else { |
| 469 | |
| 470 | #if DEBUG |
| 471 | printf("NULL ENC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
| 472 | printf("NULL_TAG_LEN: %d\n", NULL_TAG_LEN); |
| 473 | printf("plaintext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
| 474 | #endif |
| 475 | for (i=0; i < IV_LEN; i++) |
| 476 | init_vec[i] = i + (i * 16); |
| 477 | #if DEBUG |
| 478 | printf("iv: %s\n", |
| 479 | octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
| 480 | printf("plaintext: %s\n", |
| 481 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
| 482 | #endif |
| 483 | auth_tag = opaque; |
| 484 | auth_tag += *opaque_len; |
| 485 | for (i=0; i < NULL_TAG_LEN; i++) |
| 486 | auth_tag[i] = i + (i * 16); |
| 487 | *opaque_len += NULL_TAG_LEN; |
| 488 | #if DEBUG |
| 489 | printf("protected data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
| 490 | printf("protected data: %s\n", |
| 491 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
| 492 | #endif |
| 493 | |
| 494 | } |
| 495 | |
| 496 | return err_status_ok; |
| 497 | } |
| 498 | |
| 499 | err_status_t |
| 500 | null_dec(void *key, |
| 501 | const void *clear, |
| 502 | unsigned clear_len, |
| 503 | void *iv, |
| 504 | void *opaque, |
| 505 | unsigned *opaque_len) { |
| 506 | unsigned char *auth_tag; |
| 507 | |
| 508 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
| 509 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 510 | |
| 511 | /* perform authentication only */ |
| 512 | |
| 513 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
| 514 | |
| 515 | /* |
| 516 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
| 517 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
| 518 | */ |
| 519 | return err_status_fail; |
| 520 | |
| 521 | } else { |
| 522 | |
| 523 | #if DEBUG |
| 524 | printf("NULL DEC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
| 525 | |
| 526 | printf("protected data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
| 527 | printf("protected data: %s\n", |
| 528 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
| 529 | #endif |
| 530 | auth_tag = opaque; |
| 531 | auth_tag += (*opaque_len - NULL_TAG_LEN); |
| 532 | #if DEBUG |
| 533 | printf("iv: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
| 534 | #endif |
| 535 | *opaque_len -= NULL_TAG_LEN; |
| 536 | #if DEBUG |
| 537 | printf("plaintext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
| 538 | printf("plaintext: %s\n", |
| 539 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
| 540 | #endif |
| 541 | } |
| 542 | |
| 543 | return err_status_ok; |
| 544 | } |
| 545 | |
| 546 | cryptoalg_ctx_t null_cryptoalg_ctx = { |
| 547 | null_enc, |
| 548 | null_dec, |
| 549 | KEY_LEN, |
| 550 | IV_LEN, |
| 551 | NULL_TAG_LEN, |
| 552 | MAX_EXPAND, |
| 553 | }; |
| 554 | |
| 555 | cryptoalg_t null_cryptoalg = &null_cryptoalg_ctx; |
| 556 | |
| 557 | int |
| 558 | cryptoalg_get_id(cryptoalg_t c) { |
| 559 | if (c == cryptoalg) |
| 560 | return 1; |
| 561 | return 0; |
| 562 | } |
| 563 | |
| 564 | cryptoalg_t |
| 565 | cryptoalg_find_by_id(int id) { |
| 566 | switch(id) { |
| 567 | case 1: |
| 568 | return cryptoalg; |
| 569 | default: |
| 570 | break; |
| 571 | } |
| 572 | return 0; |
| 573 | } |