diff --git a/jni/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/jni/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee42fa5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/jni/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3598 @@
+/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
+#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
+	{
+	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+		return(SSLv3_server_method());
+	else
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
+	{
+	int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+
+	*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+	if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+	    (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
+		{
+		if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
+			{
+			/* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
+			ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+			*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
+			}
+		}
+	return ret;
+	}
+#endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+			ssl3_accept,
+			ssl_undefined_function,
+			ssl3_get_server_method)
+
+int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+	{
+	BUF_MEM *buf;
+	unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+	int ret= -1;
+	int new_state,state,skip=0;
+
+	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	clear_sys_error();
+
+	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+		cb=s->info_callback;
+	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+	/* init things to blank */
+	s->in_handshake++;
+	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+	if (s->cert == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+		return(-1);
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
+	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
+	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
+	 */
+	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+		{
+		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+		}
+#endif
+
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		state=s->state;
+
+		switch (s->state)
+			{
+		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+			s->renegotiate=1;
+			/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
+
+		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+			s->server=1;
+			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+			if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				return -1;
+				}
+			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+					{
+					ret= -1;
+					goto end;
+					}
+				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+					{
+					ret= -1;
+					goto end;
+					}
+				s->init_buf=buf;
+				}
+
+			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+
+			s->init_num=0;
+			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+
+			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
+				{
+				/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
+				 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
+				 */
+				if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+				
+				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+				}
+			else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+				!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+				{
+				/* Server attempting to renegotiate with
+				 * client that doesn't support secure
+				 * renegotiation.
+				 */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
+				 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
+				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+				}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+
+			s->shutdown=0;
+			ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+			s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+
+			s->shutdown=0;
+			if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
+			{
+				ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+			{
+			int al;
+			if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al))  < 0)
+					{
+					/* callback indicates firther work to be done */
+					s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+					goto end;
+					}
+			if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);	
+				/* This is not really an error but the only means to
+                                   for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
+ 				   if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 	
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);			
+				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;			
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;	
+				}
+			}
+#endif		
+			s->renegotiate = 2;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+			ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+			if (s->hit)
+				{
+				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+				else
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+				}
+#else
+			if (s->hit)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+			/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
+			/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
+			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
+				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+				{
+				ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+				else
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				skip = 1;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+				}
+#else
+				}
+			else
+				skip=1;
+
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+			/* clear this, it may get reset by
+			 * send_server_key_exchange */
+			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+				)
+				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
+				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
+				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
+				 * be able to handle this) */
+				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+			else
+				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+
+
+			/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
+			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
+			 *
+			 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
+			 *
+			 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
+			 * message only if the cipher suite is either
+			 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
+			 * server certificate contains the server's
+			 * public key for key exchange.
+			 */
+			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+			 * hint if provided */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+			    /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
+			    || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+#endif
+			    || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
+			    || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
+				    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+					&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+					)
+				    )
+				)
+			    )
+				{
+				ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+				}
+			else
+				skip=1;
+
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+			if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+				!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+				/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
+				 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
+				((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+				 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+				/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
+				 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
+				 * and in RFC 2246): */
+				((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+				 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
+				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
+				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+				 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+				/* With normal PSK Certificates and
+				 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+				|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+				{
+				/* no cert request */
+				skip=1;
+				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+				if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+					if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+						return -1;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
+				ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+#endif
+				s->init_num=0;
+				}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+			ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+		
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+
+			/* This code originally checked to see if
+			 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
+			 * and then flushed. This caused problems
+			 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
+			 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
+			 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
+			 * still exist. So instead we just flush
+			 * unconditionally.
+			 */
+
+			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+
+			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+			/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
+			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			if (ret == 2)
+				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+			else {
+				if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+					{
+					ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+					if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+					}
+				s->init_num=0;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			if (ret == 2)
+				{
+				/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
+				 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
+				 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
+				 * message is not sent.
+				 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
+				 * the client uses its key from the certificate
+				 * for key exchange.
+				 */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+				else
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+				s->init_num = 0;
+				}
+			else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+				{
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+				s->init_num=0;
+				if (!s->session->peer)
+					break;
+				/* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
+				 * at this point and digest cached records.
+				 */
+				if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+					return -1;
+					}
+				s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+				if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+					return -1;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				int offset=0;
+				int dgst_num;
+
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+				s->init_num=0;
+
+				/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
+				 * a client cert, it can be verified
+				 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
+				 * should be generalized. But it is next step
+				 */
+				if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+					if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+						return -1;
+				for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)	
+					if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 
+						{
+						int dgst_size;
+
+						s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
+						dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+						if (dgst_size < 0)
+							{
+							ret = -1;
+							goto end;
+							}
+						offset+=dgst_size;
+						}		
+				}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+
+			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
+			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+			if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->init_num = 0;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+			break;
+#endif
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			if (s->hit)
+				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+			else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+			ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+			ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+#endif
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+
+			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+			ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+				SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+			ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
+				SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+			if (s->hit)
+				{
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+				else
+					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+				}
+			else
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL_ST_OK:
+			/* clean a few things up */
+			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+			BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+			s->init_buf=NULL;
+
+			/* remove buffering on output */
+			ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+				{
+				s->renegotiate=0;
+				s->new_session=0;
+				
+				ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+				
+				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+				/* s->server=1; */
+				s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
+
+				if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+				}
+			
+			ret = 1;
+			goto end;
+			/* break; */
+
+		default:
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+			ret= -1;
+			goto end;
+			/* break; */
+			}
+		
+		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
+			{
+			if (s->debug)
+				{
+				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+					goto end;
+				}
+
+
+			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+				{
+				new_state=s->state;
+				s->state=state;
+				cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
+				s->state=new_state;
+				}
+			}
+		skip=0;
+		}
+end:
+	/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+
+	s->in_handshake--;
+	if (cb != NULL)
+		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
+		{
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
+		*(p++)=0;
+		*(p++)=0;
+		*(p++)=0;
+
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num=4;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ok;
+	long n;
+
+	/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
+	 * so permit appropriate message length */
+	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+		-1,
+		s->max_cert_list,
+		&ok);
+	if (!ok) return((int)n);
+	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
+		{
+		/* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+		 * negotiation. */
+		if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
+		 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+			{
+			DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+			s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+			}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+		if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+			{
+			EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+			s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+			}
+#endif
+		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+		return 2;
+		}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
+	unsigned int cookie_len;
+	long n;
+	unsigned long id;
+	unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
+	SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+	SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
+#endif
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
+
+	/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
+	 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
+	 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
+	 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
+	 * TLSv1.
+	 */
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
+		)
+		{
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+		}
+	s->first_packet=1;
+	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
+		SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+		&ok);
+
+	if (!ok) return((int)n);
+	s->first_packet=0;
+	d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+	/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
+	 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
+	s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
+	p+=2;
+
+	if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
+	    (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+		if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+			{
+			/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
+			s->version = s->client_version;
+			}
+		al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	/* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
+	 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
+	 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
+	 */
+	if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
+		{
+		unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
+		
+		session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+		cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
+
+		if (cookie_length == 0)
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+	/* load the client random */
+	memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+	/* get the session-id */
+	j= *(p++);
+
+	s->hit=0;
+	/* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
+	 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
+	 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+	 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
+	 * won't even compile against older library versions).
+	 *
+	 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
+	 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
+	 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+	 * setting will be ignored.
+	 */
+	if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
+		{
+	        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+			{
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
+		if (i == 1)
+			{ /* previous session */
+			s->hit=1;
+			}
+		else if (i == -1)
+			goto err;
+		else /* i == 0 */
+			{
+		        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	p+=j;
+
+	if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+		{
+		/* cookie stuff */
+		cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+		/* 
+		 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+		 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+		 * does not cause an overflow.
+		 */
+		if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
+			{
+			/* too much data */
+			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+		if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+			cookie_len > 0)
+			{
+			memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+
+			if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
+				{
+				if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+					cookie_len) == 0)
+					{
+					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 
+						SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+					goto f_err;
+					}
+				/* else cookie verification succeeded */
+				}
+			else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 
+						  s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
+				{
+					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 
+						SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+					goto f_err;
+				}
+
+			ret = 2;
+			}
+
+		p += cookie_len;
+		}
+
+	n2s(p,i);
+	if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
+		{
+		/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
+		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+	if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
+		{
+		/* not enough data */
+		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+	if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
+		== NULL))
+		{
+		goto err;
+		}
+	p+=i;
+
+	/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
+	if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
+		{
+		j=0;
+		id=s->session->cipher->id;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+		printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
+#endif
+		for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
+			{
+			c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+			printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+				i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+#endif
+			if (c->id == id)
+				{
+				j=1;
+				break;
+				}
+			}
+/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
+ * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
+ */
+#if 0
+		if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
+			{
+			/* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
+			 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
+			 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
+			 * preferences.  We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
+			 * enabled, though. */
+			c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
+			if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
+				{
+				s->session->cipher = c;
+				j = 1;
+				}
+			}
+#endif
+		if (j == 0)
+			{
+			/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
+			 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
+			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* compression */
+	i= *(p++);
+	if ((p+i) > (d+n))
+		{
+		/* not enough data */
+		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+	q=p;
+	for (j=0; j<i; j++)
+		{
+		if (p[j] == 0) break;
+		}
+
+	p+=i;
+	if (j >= i)
+		{
+		/* no compress */
+		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	/* TLS extensions*/
+	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
+		{
+		if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
+			{
+			/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
+	 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
+	 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
+	 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
+	{
+		unsigned long Time;
+		unsigned char *pos;
+		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */
+		pos=s->s3->server_random;
+		l2n(Time,pos);
+		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+	}
+
+	if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+		{
+		SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
+
+		s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+		if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
+			ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
+			{
+			s->hit=1;
+			s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
+			s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+
+			ciphers=NULL;
+
+			/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+			pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+			if (pref_cipher == NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+
+			s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
+
+			if (s->cipher_list)
+				sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+
+			if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
+				sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+			s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+			s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
+	/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
+	 * options, we will now look for them.  We have i-1 compression
+	 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
+	s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+	/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
+	if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+		{
+		int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+		/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
+		/* Can't disable compression */
+		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		/* Look for resumed compression method */
+		for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
+			{
+			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
+			if (comp_id == comp->id)
+				{
+				s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+				break;
+				}
+			}
+		if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
+		for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
+			{
+			if (q[m] == comp_id)
+				break;
+			}
+		if (m >= i)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+	else if (s->hit)
+		comp = NULL;
+	else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
+		{ /* See if we have a match */
+		int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
+
+		nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+		for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
+			{
+			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
+			v=comp->id;
+			for (o=0; o<i; o++)
+				{
+				if (v == q[o])
+					{
+					done=1;
+					break;
+					}
+				}
+			if (done) break;
+			}
+		if (done)
+			s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+		else
+			comp=NULL;
+		}
+#else
+	/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+	 * using compression.
+	 */
+	if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+#endif
+
+	/* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
+	 * pick a cipher */
+
+	if (!s->hit)
+		{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+		s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
+		s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
+#endif
+		if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
+			sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+		s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
+		if (ciphers == NULL)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		ciphers=NULL;
+		c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
+				     SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+
+		if (c == NULL)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/* Session-id reuse */
+#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
+		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+		SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
+		SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
+
+		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
+			{
+			sk=s->session->ciphers;
+			for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+				{
+				c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+				if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
+					nc=c;
+				if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
+					ec=c;
+				}
+			if (nc != NULL)
+				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
+			else if (ec != NULL)
+				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
+			else
+				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
+			}
+		else
+#endif
+		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
+		}
+
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
+		{
+		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+	
+	/* we now have the following setup. 
+	 * client_random
+	 * cipher_list 		- our prefered list of ciphers
+	 * ciphers 		- the clients prefered list of ciphers
+	 * compression		- basically ignored right now
+	 * ssl version is set	- sslv3
+	 * s->session		- The ssl session has been setup.
+	 * s->hit		- session reuse flag
+	 * s->tmp.new_cipher	- the new cipher to use.
+	 */
+
+	if (ret < 0) ret=1;
+	if (0)
+		{
+f_err:
+		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+		}
+err:
+	if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int i,sl;
+	unsigned long l;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	unsigned long Time;
+#endif
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+		{
+		buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		p=s->s3->server_random;
+		/* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
+		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */
+		l2n(Time,p);
+		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+			return -1;
+#endif
+		/* Do the message type and length last */
+		d=p= &(buf[4]);
+
+		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
+		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+
+		/* Random stuff */
+		memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+		/* There are several cases for the session ID to send
+		 * back in the server hello:
+		 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+		 *   we send back the old session ID.
+		 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+		 *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+		 *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+		 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+		 *   session ID.
+		 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+		 *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
+		 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+		 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+		 * to send back.
+		 */
+		if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+			&& !s->hit)
+			s->session->session_id_length=0;
+
+		sl=s->session->session_id_length;
+		if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		*(p++)=sl;
+		memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
+		p+=sl;
+
+		/* put the cipher */
+		i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
+		p+=i;
+
+		/* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+			*(p++)=0;
+#else
+		if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+			*(p++)=0;
+		else
+			*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return -1;
+			}
+#endif
+		/* do the header */
+		l=(p-d);
+		d=buf;
+		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
+		l2n3(l,d);
+
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num=p-buf;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
+		{
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+		/* do the header */
+		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+		*(p++)=0;
+		*(p++)=0;
+		*(p++)=0;
+
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num=4;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	unsigned char *q;
+	int j,num;
+	RSA *rsa;
+	unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	unsigned int u;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
+	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+	int encodedlen = 0;
+	int curve_id = 0;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
+#endif
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int al,i;
+	unsigned long type;
+	int n;
+	CERT *cert;
+	BIGNUM *r[4];
+	int nr[4],kn;
+	BUF_MEM *buf;
+	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
+		{
+		type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+		cert=s->cert;
+
+		buf=s->init_buf;
+
+		r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
+		n=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		if (type & SSL_kRSA)
+			{
+			rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
+			if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
+				{
+				rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
+				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+				if(rsa == NULL)
+				{
+					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+					goto f_err;
+				}
+				RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+				cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
+				}
+			if (rsa == NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			r[0]=rsa->n;
+			r[1]=rsa->e;
+			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+			}
+		else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+			if (type & SSL_kEDH)
+			{
+			dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
+			if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+				dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
+				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+			if (dhp == NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+
+			if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
+			if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+			     dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+			     (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
+				{
+				if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
+				    {
+				    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					   ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+				    goto err;
+				    }
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+				dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+				if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
+					(dh->priv_key == NULL))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			r[0]=dh->p;
+			r[1]=dh->g;
+			r[2]=dh->pub_key;
+			}
+		else 
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+			if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
+			{
+			const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+			ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
+			if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+				{
+				ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+				}
+			if (ecdhp == NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+
+			if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+			if (ecdhp == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
+			if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+			    (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+				{
+				if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+				    {
+				    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				    goto err;
+				    }
+				}
+
+			if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+			    (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||
+			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+			    (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
+			 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 
+			 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
+			 */
+			if ((curve_id = 
+			    tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+			    == 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* Encode the public key.
+			 * First check the size of encoding and
+			 * allocate memory accordingly.
+			 */
+			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
+			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
+			    NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+			encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
+			    OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 
+			bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+			if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+
+			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
+			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 
+			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
+			    encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+			if (encodedlen == 0) 
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);  bn_ctx=NULL;
+
+			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 
+			 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+			 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
+			 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+			 * structure. 
+			 */
+			n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+			/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
+			 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
+			 */
+			r[0]=NULL;
+			r[1]=NULL;
+			r[2]=NULL;
+			r[3]=NULL;
+			}
+		else 
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+			if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+				{
+				/* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
+				n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+				}
+			else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		if (type & SSL_kSRP)
+			{
+			if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+				(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+				(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
+				(s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
+			r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
+			r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
+			r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
+			}
+		else 
+#endif
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
+			{
+			nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+			if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+				n+=1+nr[i];
+			else
+#endif
+			n+=2+nr[i];
+			}
+
+		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+			&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+			{
+			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
+				== NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			pkey=NULL;
+			kn=0;
+			}
+
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		p= &(d[4]);
+
+		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
+			{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+			if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+				{
+				*p = nr[i];
+				p++;
+				}
+			else
+#endif
+			s2n(nr[i],p);
+			BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
+			p+=nr[i];
+			}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+		if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 
+			{
+			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
+			 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
+			 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+			 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+			 * the actual encoded point itself
+			 */
+			*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+			p += 1;
+			*p = 0;
+			p += 1;
+			*p = curve_id;
+			p += 1;
+			*p = encodedlen;
+			p += 1;
+			memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 
+			    (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
+			    encodedlen);
+			OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+			encodedPoint = NULL;
+			p += encodedlen;
+			}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+		if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+			{
+			/* copy PSK identity hint */
+			s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 
+			strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+			p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+			}
+#endif
+
+		/* not anonymous */
+		if (pkey != NULL)
+			{
+			/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
+			 * and p points to the space at the end. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
+					&& TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+				{
+				q=md_buf;
+				j=0;
+				for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
+					{
+					EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+						EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+					EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
+						?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+					EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
+						(unsigned int *)&i);
+					q+=i;
+					j+=i;
+					}
+				if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				s2n(u,p);
+				n+=u+2;
+				}
+			else
+#endif
+			if (md)
+				{
+				/* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
+				 * algorithm */
+				if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+					{
+					if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
+						{
+						/* Should never happen */
+						al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+						SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+						goto f_err;
+						}
+					p+=2;
+					}
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+				fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
+							EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				s2n(i,p);
+				n+=i+2;
+				if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+					n+= 2;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* Is this error check actually needed? */
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			}
+
+		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+		l2n3(n,d);
+
+		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
+		 * it off */
+		s->init_num=n+4;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		}
+
+	s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int i,j,nl,off,n;
+	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
+	X509_NAME *name;
+	BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
+		{
+		buf=s->init_buf;
+
+		d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
+
+		/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+		p++;
+		n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
+		d[0]=n;
+		p+=n;
+		n++;
+
+		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+			{
+			nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
+			s2n(nl, p);
+			p += nl + 2;
+			n += nl + 2;
+			}
+
+		off=n;
+		p+=2;
+		n+=2;
+
+		sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+		nl=0;
+		if (sk != NULL)
+			{
+			for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+				{
+				name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
+				j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
+				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
+				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+					{
+					s2n(j,p);
+					i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
+					n+=2+j;
+					nl+=2+j;
+					}
+				else
+					{
+					d=p;
+					i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
+					j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
+					n+=j;
+					nl+=j;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		/* else no CA names */
+		p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
+		s2n(nl,p);
+
+		d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
+		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+		l2n3(n,d);
+
+		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
+		 * it off */
+
+		s->init_num=n+4;
+		s->init_off=0;
+#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+
+		/* do the header */
+		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+		*(p++)=0;
+		*(p++)=0;
+		*(p++)=0;
+		s->init_num += 4;
+#endif
+
+		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int i,al,ok;
+	long n;
+	unsigned long alg_k;
+	unsigned char *p;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	RSA *rsa=NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
+	DH *dh_srvr;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+	KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+	EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
+#endif
+
+	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+		SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		2048, /* ??? */
+		&ok);
+
+	if (!ok) return((int)n);
+	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+		{
+		/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
+		if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
+			{
+			if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
+				rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
+			/* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
+			 * be sent already */
+			if (rsa == NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
+				goto f_err;
+
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
+			if (	(pkey == NULL) ||
+				(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
+				(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
+			}
+
+		/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
+		if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+			{
+			n2s(p,i);
+			if (n != i+2)
+				{
+				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				else
+					p-=2;
+				}
+			else
+				n=i;
+			}
+
+		i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
+		al = -1;
+		
+		if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
+			}
+
+		if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+			{
+			/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+			 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+			 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+			 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+			 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
+			 * protocol version.
+			 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+			if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
+				(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+
+				/* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+				 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+				 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
+				 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
+				 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
+				 * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
+				 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
+				}
+			}
+
+		if (al != -1)
+			{
+			/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
+			 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
+			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
+			ERR_clear_error();
+			i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+			p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+			p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+			if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+				goto err;
+			}
+	
+		s->session->master_key_length=
+			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+				s->session->master_key,
+				p,i);
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
+		}
+	else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+		{
+		n2s(p,i);
+		if (n != i+2)
+			{
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				p-=2;
+				i=(int)n;
+				}
+			}
+
+		if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			else
+				dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
+			}
+
+		pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
+		if (pub == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
+
+		if (i <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+			BN_clear_free(pub);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+		s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
+
+		BN_clear_free(pub);
+		pub=NULL;
+		s->session->master_key_length=
+			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+				s->session->master_key,p,i);
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
+		}
+	else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+	if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+		{
+		krb5_error_code		krb5rc;
+		krb5_data		enc_ticket;
+		krb5_data		authenticator;
+		krb5_data		enc_pms;
+		KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX		ciph_ctx;
+		const EVP_CIPHER	*enc = NULL;
+		unsigned char		iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+		unsigned char		pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+					       + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+		int		     padl, outl;
+		krb5_timestamp		authtime = 0;
+		krb5_ticket_times	ttimes;
+
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+		if (!kssl_ctx)  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+
+		n2s(p,i);
+		enc_ticket.length = i;
+
+		if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
+		p+=enc_ticket.length;
+
+		n2s(p,i);
+		authenticator.length = i;
+
+		if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		authenticator.data = (char *)p;
+		p+=authenticator.length;
+
+		n2s(p,i);
+		enc_pms.length = i;
+		enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
+		p+=enc_pms.length;
+
+		/* Note that the length is checked again below,
+		** after decryption
+		*/
+		if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			       SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+						enc_pms.length + 6))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+					&kssl_err)) != 0)
+			{
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+			printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+				krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+			if (kssl_err.text)
+				printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				kssl_err.reason);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*  Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
+		**  but will return authtime == 0.
+		*/
+		if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
+					&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
+			{
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+			printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+				krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+			if (kssl_err.text)
+				printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				kssl_err.reason);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+		kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+		enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+		if (enc == NULL)
+		    goto err;
+
+		memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);	/* per RFC 1510 */
+
+		if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
+					(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		outl += padl;
+		if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+		    {
+		    /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+		     * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+		     * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+		     * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
+		     * the protocol version.
+		     * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 
+		     * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
+		     */
+		    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			       SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		    }
+
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+		s->session->master_key_length=
+			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+				s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
+
+		if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
+			{
+			size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+			if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 
+				{
+				s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
+				memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
+				}
+			}
+
+
+		/*  Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+		**  but it caused problems for apache.
+		**  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+		**  if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+		*/
+		}
+	else
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+		if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
+		{
+		int ret = 1;
+		int field_size = 0;
+		const EC_KEY   *tkey;
+		const EC_GROUP *group;
+		const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+		/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+		if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/* Let's get server private key and group information */
+		if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
+			{ 
+			/* use the certificate */
+			tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* use the ephermeral values we saved when
+			 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
+			 */
+			tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+			}
+
+		group    = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+		priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+		if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+		    !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			       ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/* Let's get client's public key */
+		if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		if (n == 0L) 
+			{
+			/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
+
+			 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+				 {
+				 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+				 goto f_err;
+				 }
+			if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+			    == NULL) || 
+			    (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
+				{
+				/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+				 * authentication using ECDH certificates
+				 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
+				 * never executed. When that support is
+				 * added, we ought to ensure the key 
+				 * received in the certificate is 
+				 * authorized for key agreement.
+				 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
+				 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
+				 * group.
+				 */
+			   	al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			   	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				    SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
+			   	goto f_err;
+			   	}
+
+			if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* Get client's public key from encoded point
+			 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
+			 */
+			if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* Get encoded point length */
+			i = *p; 
+			p += 1;
+			if (n != 1 + i)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 
+			    clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			/* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
+			 * currently, so set it to the start 
+			 */ 
+			p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+			}
+
+		/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+		field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+		if (field_size <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
+			       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
+		if (i <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+		EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+		EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+		BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+		EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+		s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 
+
+		/* Compute the master secret */
+		s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
+		    generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
+		
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+		return (ret);
+		}
+	else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+		if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+			{
+			unsigned char *t = NULL;
+			unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
+			unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+			int psk_err = 1;
+			char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
+
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+			n2s(p,i);
+			if (n != i+2)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+			if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+			if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				       SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+
+			/* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
+			 * string for the callback */
+			memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
+			memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
+			psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
+				psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
+
+			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+			else if (psk_len == 0)
+				{
+				/* PSK related to the given identity not found */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				       SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+				al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+
+			/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+			pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
+			t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+			memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+			s2n(psk_len, t);
+			memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+			t+=psk_len;
+			s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+			if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+			s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
+			if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+
+			if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+			s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+			if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+				s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+
+			s->session->master_key_length=
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+					s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+			psk_err = 0;
+		psk_err:
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+			if (psk_err != 0)
+				goto f_err;
+			}
+		else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+			{
+			int param_len;
+
+			n2s(p,i);
+			param_len=i+2;
+			if (param_len > n)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+				OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+			s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+			if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			p+=i;
+			}
+		else
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+		if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 
+			{
+			int ret = 0;
+			EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+			EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+			unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
+			size_t outlen=32, inlen;
+			unsigned long alg_a;
+
+			/* Get our certificate private key*/
+			alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+			if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
+				pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
+			else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+				pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+
+			pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
+			EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+			/* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
+			 * use it for key exchange.  Don't mind errors from
+			 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
+			 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
+			client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+			if (client_pub_pkey)
+				{
+				if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
+					ERR_clear_error();
+				}
+			/* Decrypt session key */
+			if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) 
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+				goto gerr;
+				}
+			if (p[1] == 0x81)
+				{
+				start = p+3;
+				inlen = p[2];
+				}
+			else if (p[1] < 0x80)
+				{
+				start = p+2;
+				inlen = p[1];
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+				goto gerr;
+				}
+			if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 
+
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+				goto gerr;
+				}
+			/* Generate master secret */
+			s->session->master_key_length=
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+					s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
+			/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+			if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+				ret = 2;
+			else
+				ret = 1;
+		gerr:
+			EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
+			EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+			else
+				goto err;
+			}
+		else
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	return(1);
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
+err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+	EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+	if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 
+		EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	int al,ok,ret=0;
+	long n;
+	int type=0,i,j;
+	X509 *peer;
+	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+	EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+
+	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
+		-1,
+		516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
+		&ok);
+
+	if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+	if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+		{
+		peer=s->session->peer;
+		pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+		type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		peer=NULL;
+		pkey=NULL;
+		}
+
+	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
+		{
+		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+		if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		ret=1;
+		goto end;
+		}
+
+	if (peer == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
+		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
+	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+	/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
+	/* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
+	 * signature without length field */
+	if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
+		pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
+		{
+		i=64;
+		} 
+	else 
+		{	
+		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+			{
+			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+			/* Should never happen */
+			if (sigalg == -1)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+			if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
+			if (md == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+			p += 2;
+			n -= 2;
+			}
+		n2s(p,i);
+		n-=2;
+		if (i > n)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+    	}
+	j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+	if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		{
+		long hdatalen = 0;
+		void *hdata;
+		hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+		if (hdatalen <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+		fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
+							EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+		if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+			|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 
+	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+		{
+		i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
+			MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 
+							pkey->pkey.rsa);
+		if (i < 0)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		if (i == 0)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+		{
+		j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+			&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+			SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
+		if (j <= 0)
+			{
+			/* bad signature */
+			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+		{
+		j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+			&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+			SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
+		if (j <= 0)
+			{
+			/* bad signature */
+			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+#endif
+	if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
+		{   unsigned char signature[64];
+			int idx;
+			EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
+			EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
+			if (i!=64) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
+			}	
+			for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
+				signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
+			}	
+			j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
+			EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+			if (j<=0) 
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+					SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+				goto f_err;
+				}	
+		}
+	else	
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+
+	ret=1;
+	if (0)
+		{
+f_err:
+		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+		}
+end:
+	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+		{
+		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+		s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+		s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+		}
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
+	X509 *x=NULL;
+	unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
+	const unsigned char *p,*q;
+	unsigned char *d;
+	STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
+
+	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+		-1,
+		s->max_cert_list,
+		&ok);
+
+	if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+	if	(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
+		{
+		if (	(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+			(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		/* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
+		if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+		return(1);
+		}
+
+	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+	if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	n2l3(p,llen);
+	if (llen+3 != n)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+	for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
+		{
+		n2l3(p,l);
+		if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		q=p;
+		x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
+		if (x == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (p != (q+l))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		x=NULL;
+		nc+=l+3;
+		}
+
+	if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
+		{
+		/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
+		if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+		else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+			 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+		if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
+		if (i <= 0)
+			{
+			al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
+		X509_free(s->session->peer);
+	s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
+	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+	/* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
+	 * when we arrive here. */
+	if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+		{
+		s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+		if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
+		sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
+	s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
+	/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
+	 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
+
+	sk=NULL;
+
+	ret=1;
+	if (0)
+		{
+f_err:
+		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+		}
+err:
+	if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
+	if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned long l;
+	X509 *x;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
+		{
+		x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
+		if (x == NULL)
+			{
+			/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+			if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
+			    (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				return(0);
+				}
+			}
+
+		l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+		s->init_num=(int)l;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
+int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+		{
+		unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+		const unsigned char *const_p;
+		int len, slen_full, slen;
+		SSL_SESSION *sess;
+		unsigned int hlen;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+		HMAC_CTX hctx;
+		SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+		unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+		unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+		/* get session encoding length */
+		slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+		/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ 		 * too long
+ 		 */
+		if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
+			return -1;
+		senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
+		if (!senc)
+			return -1;
+		p = senc;
+		i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+		/* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
+		const_p = senc;
+		sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
+		if (sess == NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(senc);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
+
+		slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
+		if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(senc);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		p = senc;
+		i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
+		SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
+		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ 		 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
+ 		 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ 		 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ 		 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ 		 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ 		 */
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+			26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+			EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+			return -1;
+
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		/* do the header */
+		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
+		/* Skip message length for now */
+		p += 3;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+		HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+		/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+		 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+		 * from parent ctx.
+		 */
+		if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+			{
+			if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+							 &hctx, 1) < 0)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_free(senc);
+				return -1;
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+					tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+			HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+			memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+			}
+
+		/* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
+		 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
+		 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
+		 * as their sessions. */
+		l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
+		/* Skip ticket length for now */
+		p += 2;
+		/* Output key name */
+		macstart = p;
+		memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+		p += 16;
+		/* output IV */
+		memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+		p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+		/* Encrypt session data */
+		EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+		p += len;
+		EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+		p += len;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+		HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+		HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+		p += hlen;
+		/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+		/* Total length */
+		len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
+		l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
+		p += 4;
+		s2n(len - 10, p);  /* Ticket length */
+
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num= len;
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		OPENSSL_free(senc);
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
+		{
+		unsigned char *p;
+		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ 		 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+ 		 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+ 		 * + (ocsp response)
+ 		 */
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+			return -1;
+
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+		/* do the header */
+		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+		/* message length */
+		l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
+		/* status type */
+		*(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
+		/* length of OCSP response */
+		l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+		/* actual response */
+		memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+		s->init_off = 0;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
+	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ok;
+	int proto_len, padding_len;
+	long n;
+	const unsigned char *p;
+
+	/* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
+	 * extension in their ClientHello */
+	if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
+		SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
+		514,  /* See the payload format below */
+		&ok);
+
+	if (!ok)
+		return((int)n);
+
+	/* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
+	 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
+	 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
+	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (n < 2)
+		return 0;  /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+
+	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+	/* The payload looks like:
+	 *   uint8 proto_len;
+	 *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
+	 *   uint8 padding_len;
+	 *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
+	 */
+	proto_len = p[0];
+	if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
+		return 0;
+	padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
+	if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
+		return 0;
+
+	s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
+	if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
+	s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+# endif
+#endif