#14371: Add opensll to main repository
diff --git a/jni/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/jni/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..181bd34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/jni/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,767 @@
+/* v3_purp.c */
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2001.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
+
+static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
+ const X509_PURPOSE * const *b);
+static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
+
+static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
+ {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL},
+ {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL},
+ {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL},
+ {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL},
+ {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
+ {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
+ {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL},
+ {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
+ {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", NULL},
+};
+
+#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE)
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
+
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
+ const X509_PURPOSE * const *b)
+{
+ return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
+}
+
+/* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
+ * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
+ * things. */
+int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
+{
+ int idx;
+ const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
+ if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+ if(id == -1) return 1;
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+ if(idx == -1) return -1;
+ pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
+{
+ if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *p = purpose;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
+{
+ if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+ return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+}
+
+X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
+{
+ if(idx < 0) return NULL;
+ if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
+ return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
+ for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
+ xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
+ if(!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
+{
+ X509_PURPOSE tmp;
+ int idx;
+ if((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
+ return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
+ tmp.purpose = purpose;
+ if(!xptable) return -1;
+ idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp);
+ if(idx == -1) return -1;
+ return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
+ int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
+ char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
+{
+ int idx;
+ X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+ /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
+ flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+ /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
+ flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
+ /* Get existing entry if any */
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+ /* Need a new entry */
+ if(idx == -1) {
+ if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+ } else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+
+ /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
+ if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
+ }
+ /* dup supplied name */
+ ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name);
+ ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname);
+ if(!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
+ ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+ /* Set all other flags */
+ ptmp->flags |= flags;
+
+ ptmp->purpose = id;
+ ptmp->trust = trust;
+ ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
+ ptmp->usr_data = arg;
+
+ /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
+ if(idx == -1) {
+ if(!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
+ {
+ if(!p) return;
+ if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC)
+ {
+ if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+ OPENSSL_free(p->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(p);
+ }
+ }
+
+void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
+ for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
+ xptable = NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+ return xp->purpose;
+}
+
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+ return xp->name;
+}
+
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+ return xp->sname;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+ return xp->trust;
+}
+
+static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b)
+ {
+ return *a - *b;
+ }
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid);
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid);
+
+int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+ {
+ /* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
+ * that is those which are used by the verify process. If
+ * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
+ * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
+ * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
+ * searched using bsearch.
+ */
+
+ static const int supported_nids[] = {
+ NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
+ NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
+ NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
+ NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
+ NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
+ NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */
+ NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */
+#endif
+ NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
+ NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */
+ NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */
+ NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */
+ NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */
+ };
+
+ int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
+
+ if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids,
+ sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int)))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
+ {
+ X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
+ int i;
+ if (dp->reasons)
+ {
+ if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
+ dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
+ if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
+ dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
+ dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+ }
+ else
+ dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+ if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+ if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
+ {
+ iname = gen->d.directoryName;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!iname)
+ iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+
+ DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
+
+ }
+
+static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
+ {
+ int i;
+ x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
+ setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
+ }
+
+static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
+{
+ BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
+ PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
+ EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+
+ int i;
+ if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
+#endif
+ /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
+ if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
+ /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
+ if(!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
+ /* Handle basic constraints */
+ if((bs=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
+ if(bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
+ if(bs->pathlen) {
+ if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+ || !bs->ca) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ x->ex_pathlen = 0;
+ } else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
+ } else x->ex_pathlen = -1;
+ BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
+ }
+ /* Handle proxy certificates */
+ if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
+ || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, 0) >= 0
+ || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, 0) >= 0) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ }
+ if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
+ x->ex_pcpathlen =
+ ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
+ } else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
+ PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+ }
+ /* Handle key usage */
+ if((usage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+ if(usage->length > 0) {
+ x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
+ if(usage->length > 1)
+ x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
+ } else x->ex_kusage = 0;
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
+ }
+ x->ex_xkusage = 0;
+ if((extusage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
+ switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage,i))) {
+ case NID_server_auth:
+ x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_client_auth:
+ x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_email_protect:
+ x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_code_sign:
+ x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_ms_sgc:
+ case NID_ns_sgc:
+ x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_OCSP_sign:
+ x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_time_stamp:
+ x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_dvcs:
+ x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+ }
+
+ if((ns=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
+ if(ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
+ else x->ex_nscert = 0;
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
+ }
+ x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+ x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+ x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+ x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL);
+ if (!x->nc && (i != -1))
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ setup_crldp(x);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ x->rfc3779_addr =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL);
+ x->rfc3779_asid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum,
+ NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++)
+ {
+ ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
+ if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
+ continue;
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
+ == NID_freshest_crl)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
+ if (!X509_supported_extension(ex))
+ {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+}
+
+/* CA checks common to all purposes
+ * return codes:
+ * 0 not a CA
+ * 1 is a CA
+ * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
+ * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
+ * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
+ */
+
+#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
+#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
+
+static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
+{
+ /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
+ if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0;
+ if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
+ if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1;
+ /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
+ else return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
+ if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3;
+ /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
+ else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4;
+ /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
+ else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT
+ && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5;
+ /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
+{
+ if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+
+ return check_ca(x);
+}
+
+/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
+static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
+{
+ int ca_ret;
+ ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+ if(!ca_ret) return 0;
+ /* check nsCertType if present */
+ if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
+ else return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+ if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
+ if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
+ /* We need to do digital signatures with it */
+ if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return 0;
+ /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
+ if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+ if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0;
+ if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
+
+ if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0;
+ /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */
+ if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
+ if(!ret || ca) return ret;
+ /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
+ if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* common S/MIME checks */
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+ if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0;
+ if(ca) {
+ int ca_ret;
+ ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+ if(!ca_ret) return 0;
+ /* check nsCertType if present */
+ if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret;
+ else return 0;
+ }
+ if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
+ if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1;
+ /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
+ if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
+ if(!ret || ca) return ret;
+ if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
+ if(!ret || ca) return ret;
+ if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+ if(ca) {
+ int ca_ret;
+ if((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret;
+ else return 0;
+ }
+ if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
+ * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
+ */
+
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+ /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know"
+ value (2)? */
+ if(ca) return check_ca(x);
+ /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int ca)
+{
+ int i_ext;
+
+ /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
+ if (ca) return check_ca(x);
+
+ /*
+ * Check the optional key usage field:
+ * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
+ * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
+ * be rejected).
+ */
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
+ && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
+ !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
+ i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, 0);
+ if (i_ext >= 0)
+ {
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext);
+ if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
+ * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
+ * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
+ * subject name.
+ * These are:
+ * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
+ * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
+ * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
+ * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
+ * codes for X509_verify_cert()
+ */
+
+int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
+{
+ if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
+ X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+ x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
+ x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
+
+ if(subject->akid)
+ {
+ int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
+ if (ret != X509_V_OK)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if(subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+ {
+ if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
+ return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ else if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
+ return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
+ return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+ {
+
+ if(!akid)
+ return X509_V_OK;
+
+ /* Check key ids (if present) */
+ if(akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
+ return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
+ /* Check serial number */
+ if(akid->serial &&
+ ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
+ return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+ /* Check issuer name */
+ if(akid->issuer)
+ {
+ /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
+ * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
+ * There may be more than one but we only take any
+ * notice of the first.
+ */
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+ X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+ int i;
+ gens = akid->issuer;
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
+ {
+ gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+ if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
+ {
+ nm = gen->d.dirn;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
+ return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ }
+